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Article

Generous to a Fault? Fair Shares and
Charitable Giving
Miranda Perry Fleischer†
“In charity there is no excess.”
Sir Francis Bacon1

Charities play a vital role in our society. In addition to enhancing pluralism, private philanthropy meets many societal
needs more efficiently, creatively, and effectively than government alone. Schools ranging from Ivy League universities to
small private kindergartens teach our youth and advance
knowledge. Religious organizations offer spiritual comfort to
millions of Americans, while groups as diverse as neighborhood
health clinics and the Gates Foundation improve the health of
countless others. The Red Cross and the Salvation Army aid
thousands of distressed individuals each year, while art institutions ranging from the Metropolitan Opera to neighborhood
community theaters enrich American culture.
Given the charitable sector’s importance and value, it is
not surprising that the Internal Revenue Code encourages cha† Associate Professor and Richard W. and Marie L. Corman Scholar,
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Fennell, Victor Fleischer, Amanda Frost, Daniel Halperin, Al Harberger, Clare
Huntington, Bill Klein, Lloyd Mayer, Ajay Mehrotra, Julie Roin, Deborah
Schenk, Larry Solum, Kirk Stark, Phil Weiser, David Zaring, Larry Zelenak,
and Eric Zolt for insightful comments, as well as participants in the 2006 Junior Tax Scholars’ Workshop, the UCLA Tax Policy Colloquium, and faculty
workshops at the University of Colorado and the University of Illinois for the
same. I would also like to thank Kamille Curylo-Delcour and Andrew Tessman
for wonderful research assistance. Copyright © 2008 by Miranda Perry
Fleischer.
1. FRANCIS BACON, OF GOODNESS, AND GOODNESS OF NATURE, in ESSAYS CIVIL AND MORAL (1625), reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON
271 (1826).
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ritable giving by allowing a deduction for charitable donations.2
What is surprising is that the code treats the most generous
among us less favorably than those of average generosity. This
mismatch stems from one of the most puzzling limits in the Internal Revenue Code: the cap that prevents an individual from
claiming a charitable deduction greater than fifty percent of
her income, even if she gives more than half her income to
charity.3 As a result, someone who generously donates all her
income to charity must still pay income tax.
Neither the fifty-percent limit nor the broad principle it
represents are well-theorized. Only a few scholars have explored the question of whether an individual who gives all her
income to charity should also pay income tax or whether the
tax code’s current limits are appropriate.4 Those who have addressed this issue appear hard-pressed to find a satisfactory
justification for limiting one’s deduction.5 Only one explanation—that the cap serves as a crude alternative minimum tax

2. See I.R.C. § 170 (West Supp. 2008).
3. See id. § 170(b)(1). As explained in Part I, this fifty-percent limit applies only to cash contributions to public charities. Limits of thirty percent or
twenty percent apply in other instances, depending on the asset donated and
the recipient charity. See id. Similar limits apply to corporations: generally,
they can deduct no more than ten percent of their income. Id. § 170(b)(2).
While the corporate provisions are interesting and merit further study elsewhere, this Article focuses only on the individual limit.
4. Some scholars have, however, criticized the current limits on a practical level for dampening giving by creating unnecessary complexity. C. Eugene Steuerle & Martin A. Sullivan, Toward More Simple and Effective Giving: Reforming the Tax Rules for Charitable Contributions and Charitable
Organizations, 12 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 399, 411–12 (1995).
5. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Bequests and the Federal Estate
Tax: Proposed Restrictions on Deductibility, The Seventh Mortimer H. Hess
Memorial Lecture, in 31 THE RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, 1976, at 168–70 (discussing the implications of percentage
limits on charitable bequests); Daniel Halperin, A Charitable Contribution of
Appreciated Property and the Realization of Built-In Gains, 56 TAX L. REV. 1,
23–25 (2002) (asserting that arguments defending percentage limits “have
merit” but “are not overwhelming”). Only a handful of scholars have proffered
explanations with which they appear at least somewhat satisfied. See, e.g.,
Johnny Rex Buckles, The Community Income Theory of the Charitable Contributions Deduction, 80 IND. L.J. 947, 985–86 (2005) (“To allow all of the resources of the wealthy to fund those charitable activities that they value, at
the cost of denying the federal government any control over the use of such
funds, may simply be politically unacceptable. . . .”); Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 4, at 413–15 (suggesting that the cap may serve to limit government
outlays or as an alternative minimum tax).
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ensuring that everyone above a certain economic income pays
some tax—has gained any scholarly traction.6
That explanation is insufficient. The alternative minimum
tax (AMT)7 addresses the results of some tax preferences that
allow individuals to retain substantial economic income for
their own use that goes untaxed.8 This justification for the
AMT, however, does not apply to tax preferences for charitable
contributions. By definition, someone who makes a charitable
donation does not retain the gifted assets for her own use. The
minimum tax explanation therefore does not satisfactorily answer the question whether, if an individual keeps no income for
herself and instead donates it all to a cause worthy enough to
merit a charitable deduction—such as feeding the poor, supporting educational institutions, or funding the arts—she
should still pay some income tax.
This Article is the first of two that seek better to answer
the question of whether limiting the ability of taxpayers who
make substantial contributions to take a charitable deduction
is justified.9 This two-part series answers that question in the
affirmative, relying on two complementary theories. The first is
based on economic theory; the second is rooted in political philosophy.
This first Article articulates the economic argument, which
is grounded in the existing public goods literature. That body of
work posits that a subsidy for charitable donations is warranted because a democratic process dependent on majority
preferences10 will supply public goods only at the level de6. See Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 4, at 414; see also infra note 173.
7. See I.R.C. § 55 (2000) (codifying the alternative minimum tax).
8. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, at 8–12 (1969), reprinted in 1969
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1653–56 (noting reasons for enacting the alternative minimum tax).
9. As explained in Part I, the current subsidy is structured as a deduction that is limited to some portion of one’s adjusted gross income. Another
way of subsidizing charity while precluding a taxpayer from “zeroing out” her
tax liability would be a credit for charitable contributions limited to some portion of her tentative liability. My goal is not to explore whether the current
rule—a limited deduction rather than a limited credit—is justified, or even
whether a deduction is preferable to a credit. Rather, the broader question I
explore is whether subsidizing charitable donations while still requiring donors to pay some income tax is justified.
10. Although I recognize that majority preferences do not always prevail
due to intrinsic characteristics of our legislative system, I take the majoritarian model in the public goods literature on the charitable deduction as my
starting point. See, e.g., JOHN D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE
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manded by the median voter.11 This majority, which I term the
“classic majority,” therefore supplies some public goods (for example, a lighthouse or national defense), but not others (perhaps a community theater). Individuals supporting the undersupplied public goods then coalesce to form what I term a “new
majority” that agrees to provide partial funding (via a tax subsidy) for each individual’s preferred minority projects.12 In that
manner, charitable tax subsidies allow individuals whose preferences differ from the classic majority to redirect a portion of
funds otherwise flowing to the federal treasury toward their
preferred visions of the public good.
Two majorities now exist simultaneously: the classic majority, which has agreed to fund the lighthouse, national defense,
and other projects not suffering from government failure,13 and
the new majority, which has coalesced for the purpose of approving partial funding for minority-preferred projects.14 By
definition, some voters are members of both groups. How can
TAX EXEMPTION 101–02 (1995); Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the
Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector Economy, in THE ECONOMICS OF
NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS 21, 24–25 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986). Existing literature recognizes that majority votes do not always determine political
outcomes but uses the majoritarian model for simplicity. COLOMBO & HALL,
supra; Weisbrod, supra, at 23–24. I explore the possible role of limits on the
charitable subsidy in non-majoritarian situations in Part IV.E.
11. For an explanation of this phenomenon, see infra Part III.A.1.
12. I refer to these as “minority” projects because the classic majority
voted not to fund them.
13. Many government projects are not “public goods” in the economic
sense. The point, however, is that the legislative process only funds projects
(whether public goods or not) that do not suffer from government failure.
14. Not all projects undertaken by nonprofits constitute public goods in
the economic sense. Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contribution
Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1397–98 (1988). Although the requirements of
§ 501(c)(3) and § 170 generally ensure that their partial subsidies flow to organizations providing public goods, their contours are imperfect. Id. at 1398;
see also COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 108. Not all organizations providing public goods qualify for such subsidies, and not all qualifying groups provide public goods. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 108. Generally speaking, however, groups qualifying for subsidies that do not provide pure public
goods in the economic sense either provide impure public goods or provide
some other “public benefit” to society. Id. at 109. In other words, there are
limits on which projects may receive these subsidies; one cannot qualify for a
partial subsidy for just any project not funded by the government.
The point for purposes of this Article is that some individuals with a different view of what projects are good for society (including pure public goods,
impure public goods, and other “public benefiting” projects) coalesce to receive
partial funding for these projects. Because the literature with which I am
working speaks of “public goods,” I will continue to use that term.
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these two majorities exist simultaneously? How do voters who
are members of both majorities balance their competing interests? Current literature ignores these questions.
This Article argues that these two majorities strike a bargain with each other, which I term the “dual-majority bargain,”
by splitting the governmental “pie” equally:15 the classic majority will fund the new majority’s preferred projects only to the
extent the new majority agrees to fund the classic majority’s
preferred projects, and vice versa. Limiting an individual’s charitable deduction to half of her income implements this bargain
by ensuring that the amount of governmental subsidy for the
individual’s preferred projects will not exceed the amount of
taxes she pays to fund the classic majority’s projects.16 This
bargain-saving role is, I argue, a compelling explanation for
precluding a taxpayer from erasing her tax liability by making
charitable contributions.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the income tax
charitable deduction and the current percentage-of-income limitations. Part II explores whether the base-measurement
theory for the deduction justifies limiting an individual’s deduction to some portion of her income, and concludes that, at best,
it does so only weakly. Part III explains the subsidy theory for
the deduction, assesses existing normative theories for precluding someone from zeroing out her tax liability by making charitable contributions, and concludes that none are satisfactory.
Part IV details the economic dual-majority bargain justification. The Article concludes that the percentage-of-income limits
are integral to the functioning of a democratic society because
they enable individuals to fund cherished charities while also
shouldering their civic responsibilities to pay for government
projects.

15. As explored in Part IV.C, the two majorities do not necessarily have to
make the split fifty-fifty. Splitting down the middle, however, may reflect
common heuristics often observed in bargaining, even in situations where parties have unequal bargaining power (such as the ultimatum game). See infra
note 215.
16. A tax credit limited to half of an individual’s tentative tax liability
would have the same effect.
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION
AND THE CURRENT PERCENTAGE-OF-INCOME LIMITS
A charitable deduction has been part of the income tax
since 1917.17 It allows individuals who make voluntary transfers to organizations formed for religious, scientific, literary,
educational, and other charitable purposes18 to deduct such
transfers from their adjusted gross income (AGI).19 Despite the
deduction’s longstanding place in the tax system, no consensus
exists as to its purpose.20 As explained in Parts II and III, some
theorists argue that the charitable deduction is necessary to
measure income, while others believe that it is best characterized as a subsidy for charitable activity.21
Limits on the deduction have also been a permanent fixture in the tax system, although their form and magnitude

17. John K. McNulty, Public Policy and Private Charity: A Tax Policy
Perspective, 3 VA. TAX REV. 229, 229 & n.1 (1984).
18. Organizations eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions under
§ 170 generally are also eligible for tax-exemption under § 501(c)(3). COLOMBO
& HALL, supra note 10, at 20. To that end, analytical interpretations of which
purposes qualify an entity for § 170 generally apply to § 501(c)(3), and vice
versa. Id. Interpretations of “charitable purposes” are broad and support a
wide variety of goals: preserving the environment, providing traditional legal
aid as well as cause-oriented public interest litigation, furthering public
health, supporting the arts, and so on. See generally 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1
(2008). As a general rule, such organizations must provide some type of “community benefit” by fulfilling needs unmet by the private market. John D. Colombo, The Role of Access in Charitable Tax Exemption, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 343,
366 (2004).
19. I.R.C. § 170 (West Supp. 2008). Very generally, AGI represents one’s
net income after deducting from gross income the expenses of producing that
income. See id. § 62; see also id. § 61 (defining gross income).
20. See David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L.
REV. 531, 547 (2006) (describing the theories of the charitable deduction as
“underdetermined” and “undertheorized”).
21. If the purpose is to subsidize charitable giving rather than measure
income, a tax credit would achieve the same goal and may even be more efficient. Compare Jeff Strnad, The Charitable Contribution Deduction: A PoliticoEconomic Analysis, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, supra
note 10 at 272–76 (supporting a deduction), with Harold M. Hochman & James
D. Rodgers, The Optimal Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions, in THE
ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10 at 236 (supporting a
credit). A tax credit would work as follows: Individuals would first compute
their taxable income and tentative tax liability without regard to charitable
contributions. Then, those making charitable contributions would be eligible to
claim a tax credit to offset some of their tentative tax liability. MICHAEL J.
GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 219–20 (5th ed.
2005).
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have fluctuated.22 Until the mid-1950s, the Code limited most
people to a deduction equal to fifteen percent of their income;
the limit rose to thirty percent in 1954 and remained at that
level until 1969.23 Also prior to 1969, individuals whose charitable gifts and income taxes together surpassed ninety percent
of their taxable income in eight of the ten preceding years were
allowed an unlimited deduction.24 Although intended to benefit
nuns and other individuals taking a vow of poverty, the unlimited deduction had an unintended consequence: it enabled
people to donate low-basis, high-appreciation property to charity and receive an unlimited deduction based on the property’s
high fair-market value relative to their income.25 Even though
such individuals still retained substantial income for their own
use, some paid no tax due to the unlimited deduction.26 Congress repealed this targeted unlimited deduction in 1969, but
although it explicitly criticized wealthy individuals who paid
little or no tax due to the charitable deduction, the legislative
history does not link this phenomenon to the donation of appreciated property.27 Interestingly, the legislative history suggests
22. Initially, the deduction was limited to fifteen percent of “net taxable
income” with no carry-forwards for any unused deduction. Vada Waters Lindsey, The Charitable Contribution Deduction: A Historical Review and a Look to
the Future, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1056, 1061–63 & n.35 (2003). The limit loosened
somewhat in 1944 when it changed to fifteen percent of AGI (because AGI is
generally larger than net taxable income, this resulted in a higher limit). Id.
at 1062. It rose to twenty percent of AGI in 1952 and then to thirty percent in
1954; in 1964, Congress allowed individual carry-forwards. Id. at 1062–63 &
n.35. The current fifty-percent limit was codified in 1969. Id. at 1065.
23. Id. at 1064.
24. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(C) (1964); see also R. Palmer Baker, Jr.,
The Tax Treatment of Charitable Contribution Deductions Under the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, in 20 PROC. ANN. TUL. TAX INST. 327, 331 (1971). Despite
a 1924 Senate proposal to allow an unlimited deduction to individuals who
regularly contributed a substantial portion of their income, such a deduction
was not implemented until 1964. Lindsey, supra note 22, at 1064. As a result,
the unlimited deduction was in effect only five years. Interestingly, the legislative history of the 1924 proposal implies that taxing someone who was already
benefiting society by donating large portions of his income to charitable organizations seemed superfluous. The history provides that “[t]his provision is designed substantially to free from income taxation one who is habitually contributing to benevolent organizations amounts equalling [sic] virtually his entire
income.” J.S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAX LAWS, 1938-1861, at 34 (1938) (quoting S. REP. NO. 68-398, at 24 (1924)).
25. Halperin, supra note 5, at 24.
26. Id.
27. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(b), 83 Stat. 487,
550–53 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 170(b) (2000); Halperin, supra note 5,
at 24 & n.80.
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that fewer than 100 individuals per year used the unlimited
deduction, albeit at a cost to the Treasury of $25 million.28
Also in 1969, the general AGI limit rose to its current level
of fifty percent.29 This limitation means that even if someone
donates all her income to charity, she can only deduct up to fifty percent of her income in the year of the contribution. The
remaining amount carries forward for five years.30 The general
fifty-percent limit applies to cash contributions to public charities.31 If some of the donor’s contributions are of appreciated
property or are made to a private foundation,32 more stringent
AGI limitations of thirty percent apply.33 In addition, contributions of appreciated property to private foundations are capped
at twenty percent of AGI.34 Carry-forwards are allowed in the
latter two scenarios as well.35
Although the legislative history of the limits suggests they
were intended to target a small number of wealthy taxpayers,36
the limits apply to all income levels and affect a larger number
of taxpayers than one might suspect. In 2003, approximately
500,000 returns included charitable deductions carried forward
from previous years.37 The amount of these carried-forward de28. Baker, supra note 24, at 330.
29. Tax Reform Act § 201(b)(1)(A).
30. I.R.C. § 170(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2008).
31. “Public charities” are the organizations that spring to mind when most
people think of the words “charity” or “nonprofit”; they include schools, homeless shelters, tutoring programs, churches, and the like. Most such groups
conduct charitable activities directly and obtain income from a range of
sources, including donations from the public, dues from members, fees for services, and grants from private foundations. “Supporting organizations,” which
are entities that are organized and operated solely for the benefit of groups
that conduct charitable activities directly, are also considered public charities.
BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 11.3, at 287,
293–94 (8th ed. 2003). The term “public charity” is colloquial; these organizations are not defined as such in the Code. Id.
32. A “private foundation” is a charitable organization initially funded by
a single source, such as an individual, a family, or a corporation, whose income
comes from investments rather than fees for services or donations from the
public, and who makes grants to other charities instead of conducting its own
charitable activities. HOPKINS, supra note 31, at 274; see also I.R.C. § 509
(West Supp. 2008).
33. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(B)–(C).
34. Id. § 170(b)(1)(D).
35. Id. § 170(b)(1)(B)–(D).
36. See infra Part III.B.4.
37. Michael Parisi & Scott Hollenbeck, Individual Income Tax Returns,
2003, in 25 STATISTICS OF INCOME DIVISION, IRS, SOI BULLETIN 9, 44 tbl.3
(Fall 2005). Due to the manner in which the IRS reports data, the amount of
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ductions that were usable in 2003 totaled over $25.5 billion,38
comprising about eighteen percent of all individual income tax
charitable deductions claimed in 2003.39 That amount exceeds
the amounts of charitable bequests ($18.2 billion) and corporate
giving ($11.1 billion) for 2003 and approaches the level of foundation giving for that year ($26.8 billion).40
The extent to which the limits apply to taxpayers at all income levels is surprising. Of the roughly 500,000 returns claiming a carried-over deduction in 2003, over 191,000 returns
(about 38%) showed an AGI under $25,000.41 Approximately an
additional 214,000 returns (roughly 43%) reflected an AGI between $25,000 and $100,000.42 Just over 89,000 returns (almost
18%) showed an AGI between $100,000 and $1 million and only
about 6500 returns (approximately 1.3%) had an AGI greater
than $1 million.43 Because AGI reflects only current income
and not accumulated wealth, it is likely that some of the generous lower-income taxpayers who carry forward charitable deductions have substantial wealth but little current income.44 It
is also likely, however, that others among these lower-income

carried-over deductions claimed in a given year is a more accessible way of
measuring the impact of the limits rather than trying to ascertain the amount
of deductions not claimed in a given year because of the limits. To be sure,
however, these data do not illuminate how many contributions in a given year
were not made at all due to the limits.
38. Id.
39. See id. (stating that taxpayers claimed $145.7 billion in individual
income tax charitable deductions in 2003).
40. See CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. UNIV., GIVING USA 2006, at 204
(2006).
41. See Parisi & Hollenbeck, supra note 37.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. An examination of estate tax data sheds light on the interplay between accumulated wealth and income. A recent ten-year panel study of individuals who died between 1996 and 1998 showed that a fair number of individuals with estates over $1 million (in 1997 dollars) had mean AGIs lower
than $1 million for the ten years before death. See David Joulfaian, Charitable
Giving in Life and at Death, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 350,
355 tbl.8-3 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2001). Of such decedents, more than
five percent had a negative mean AGI, approximately one percent had a mean
AGI between zero and $50,000, just over two percent had a mean AGI between
$50,000 and $100,000, and about eight percent had a mean AGI between
$100,000 and $200,000. See id. at 358 tbl.8-5. Approximately eighteen percent
had a mean AGI between $200,000 and $500,000, and nineteen percent had a
mean AGI between $500,000 and $1 million. See id. The remaining forty-seven
percent had a mean AGI over $1 million. See id.
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taxpayers do not have substantial accumulated assets and are
considered lower or middle class.45
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, Congress temporarily
lifted these limits for contributions made between August 28,
2005 and December 31, 2005 by passing the Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA).46 Although prompted by
Katrina, the Act removed the fifty-percent AGI limitation for
cash contributions to any public charity—whether engaged in
hurricane relief or not.47 Congress had two motivations in passing the Act. First, it wanted not only to spur giving to hurricane
relief groups but also to assist other charities susceptible to donor fatigue in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the December 2004 tsunami in Asia.48 Second, Congress sought to forestall a potential drop in donations from rising gas prices and
fears of an economic downturn.49 One year later, in the Pension
Protection Act of 2006, Congress again temporarily lifted the
limits in narrow circumstances: the Act excluded from income
IRA distributions of up to $100,000 made directly to charitable
recipients in 2006 and 2007.50 Excluding such distributions
from a retiree’s income rendered the AGI limits inapplicable.
Unfortunately, it is too early to estimate, even roughly,
whether these provisions will have a long-term impact on giving.51 Early and unofficial data suggest that KETRA spurred
45. The Treasury study also shows, however, that mean AGI tends to rise
with estate size. Id. at 355 tbl.8-4. Thus, it is also quite likely that some extremely charitable individuals with low AGIs do not have much accumulated
wealth. Unfortunately, more detailed information on these taxpayers—
regarding the organizations they donate to and information on why someone
with an AGI of only $50,000 might give more than $25,000 in a year—is unavailable.
46. Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-73, 119
Stat. 2016, 2022–23. The Act also temporarily repealed the then three-percent
phase-out of itemized deductions in § 68 for charitable contributions and increased the corporate limit from five percent to ten percent (but only for contributions to hurricane-related charities). See id.
47. Id.
48. 151 CONG. REC. H8020–21 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 2005) (statements of
Reps. Hayworth & Souder); Holly Hall, A Special Katrina-Inspired Tax Break
Produced Mixed Results for Charities, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Jan. 26, 2006,
at 18; Stephanie Strom, Hurricane Tax Break Spurs Triple Projected Donations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2007, at A9.
49. Strom, supra note 48, at A9.
50. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1201(a), 120
Stat. 780, 1063–64 (2006) (amending I.R.C. § 408(d) (2000)).
51. For KETRA, this is so because gifts made in 2005 will appear on returns due as late as August of 2006, and a lag time exists between filing due
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$11 billion in charitable donations, costing the Treasury more
than $3 billion—far greater than the estimated cost of $819
million.52 However, anecdotal evidence suggests that while
KETRA may have encouraged some gifts that otherwise would
have gone unmade, it also simply shifted some giving planned
for 2006 or later into 2005, as donors fulfilled pledges early or
otherwise sped up giving to utilize the temporary provision.53
In the past, short-term increases in giving due to temporary,
favorable tax provisions have been followed by short-term drops
when the favorable provisions disappear, resulting in no real
increase in overall gifts.54 Many experts thus do not anticipate
a long-term increase in giving from KETRA.55 At passage, however, the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated KETRA’s revenue effect between 2006 and 2015 from lifting the limits and
the three-percent phase-out to be over $871 million.56 It is unclear how to interpret this estimate. On the one hand, it may
indicate that the committee expected an increase in otherwise
unmade gifts. On the other hand, it may reflect an expectation
that donors previously unable to deduct the full amount of their
gifts (even with the carry-forwards) could now take a full deduction, meaning that overall giving was not necessarily expected to increase. Regardless of these provisions’ ultimate im-

dates and the IRS’s release of statistics from a given set of returns. According
to Melissa Brown, the IRS has indicated that it will not release final data on
2005 charitable giving until the fall of 2007. Telephone Interview with Melissa
Brown, Editor, Giving USA (Jan. 8, 2007). For the Pension Protection Act, this
is because the provision does not expire until the end of 2007, Pension Protection Act, § 1201(a), meaning that many gifts eligible for the provision have not
even been reported to the IRS yet.
52. Strom, supra note 48, at A9.
53. CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. UNIV., supra note 40, at 67. It appears
that large charities that reached out to their donors about KETRA’s provisions
(such as Cornell, Haverford, and the ACLU) were the main beneficiaries of
KETRA’s largesse. Hall, supra note 48, at 18.
54. CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. UNIV., supra note 40, at 124.
55. For example, Patrick M. Rooney, the director of research at Indiana
University’s Center on Philanthropy, opined that “[p]eople are using these
special incentives to pay off pledges early and make other gifts they were
planning on making over the next several years. . . . I don’t know that anyone
thinks this means charity will increase dramatically over the next several
years.” Strom, supra note 48, at A9.
56. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE HOUSE RESOLUTION OF CONCURRENCE WITH AN AMENDMENT TO
THE SENATE AMENDMENT TO H.R. 3768, THE “KATRINA EMERGENCY TAX RELIEF ACT OF 2006” 1–3 (Comm. Print 2005).
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pact, many in the charitable community believe that the AGI
limits dampen giving.57
II. BASE MEASUREMENT AND LIMITING THE
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION
This Article explores the possibility that features intrinsic
to the Code or to the legislative subsidy process justify a limit
on an individual’s ability to reduce her tax liability to zero
through charitable deductions.58 Determining whether the limits are justified based on the internal logic of the Code or the
subsidy, however, requires understanding why the Code allows
charitable deductions in the first instance. Two rationales, detailed below, predominate in justifying the deduction: the basemeasurement theory and the subsidy theory. I argue that if one
subscribes to the base-measurement theory, limiting a given
individual’s charitable deduction to some portion of her income
is only weakly justified. If, however, one believes that the subsidy theory justifies the deduction, then percentage-of-income
limits on the subsidy are strongly justified by economic theory.
A. THE BASE-MEASUREMENT THEORY FOR THE DEDUCTION
The base-measurement theory, first articulated by Professor William Andrews, suggests that a deduction for charitable
transfers is necessary to measure income accurately.59 Starting
from the Haig-Simons definition of the ideal income tax base as
accumulation plus consumption,60 Andrews argued that per57. See, e.g., Strom, supra note 48, at A9. One fund-raising consultant
predicted that KETRA might spur as much as ten billion dollars in charitable
gifts. See id.
58. A second possibility, of course, is that a reason extrinsic to the Code
and the subsidy process justifies a limit. As explained in the Conclusion, the
second part of this series argues that limiting the subsidy granted any given
individual is also justified on political theory grounds extrinsic to tax policy.
59. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86
HARV. L. REV. 309, 309 (1972).
60. More specifically, Haig-Simons defines income as the sum of what an
individual consumes during the taxable period plus the increase in his wealth.
Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income—Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921); see also HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938) (defining income as consumption plus wealth at the end of a tax period less starting wealth). Because this
definition focuses on purchasing power, most scholars believe it to be the purest definition of what should constitute “income” for purposes of levying an
income tax in accordance with ability to pay. E.g., DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 16 (1986). Although the Code departs from this
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sonal consumption, and therefore income, should not include
amounts expended by an individual for charitable purposes.61
In other words, such expenditures should be excluded from the
ideal income tax base.
As explained by Andrews, “consumption” for purposes of
measuring taxable income should include only the “private consumption of divisible goods and services whose consumption by
one household precludes their direct enjoyment by others.”62
Charitable contributions, he reasoned, deflect resources away
from private use and toward common goods “whose enjoyment
is not confined to contributors nor apportioned among contributors according to the amounts of their contributions.”63 Under
this reasoning, because any benefit the donor receives is necessarily shared by others, a charitable contribution should not
constitute consumption.64 In a similar vein, Boris Bittker has
argued that charitable contributions have such a high moral
value that they should not be considered consumption, and
therefore should be ignored when determining the amount of
income at the voluntary disposal of the taxpayer.65 To these
ends, some tax theorists believe that allowing a deduction for
charitable contributions is necessary to define the income tax
base.66
ideal in many important respects, it is considered a benchmark against which
to measure various aspects of our current system. See, e.g., id.; GRAETZ &
SCHENK, supra note 21, at 89–91.
61. Andrews, supra note 59, at 344–75.
62. Id. at 346.
63. Id. For example, “a wealthy man cannot purchase and enjoy the sound
of a new church organ without conferring a benefit on his fellow parishioners
. . . [and] [a]ttendance at church on a particular Sunday . . . will not immediately prevent someone else from doing the same thing.” Id. at 357–58. Modern economic terminology refers to such goods as “public goods.” Gergen, supra
note 14, at 1397. For that reason, some scholars have recharacterized Andrews’s argument as simply another rationale for subsidizing public goods. See
id. at 1416.
64. Andrews, supra note 59, at 344 –75.
65. Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28 TAX L. REV. 37, 46–49, 58–59 (1972); see also Rob Atkinson,
Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 628 (1990) (arguing
that charitable transfers should be exempted from tax due to their altruistic
nature).
66. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 59, at 344 –75; McNulty, supra note 17,
at 233. As explained in note 21, supra, by definition, deductions (as opposed to
credits) determine the appropriate tax base. In contrast, after one determines
the tax base and tentative tax, credits then adjust one’s tax liability. Although
a deduction and a credit each ultimately lower the taxes actually owed, as a
technical matter, a deduction is the appropriate means of defining the tax
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B. BASE-MEASUREMENT AND PERCENTAGE-OF-INCOME LIMITS
If a charitable deduction helps define the ideal income tax
base, perhaps a limited deduction, rather than an unlimited
one, most accurately measures income. This section explores
two alternative conceptions of income measurement under
which precluding a taxpayer from zeroing out her tax liability
might be justified.
1. Measuring Consumption
Perhaps precluding someone from reducing her taxable income to zero through charitable deductions reflects a notion
that charitable transfers involve some element of personal consumption and therefore should not be completely exempted
from taxation. This rationale is initially plausible: giving is voluntary, and donors choose to make donations instead of purchasing wine, vacation homes, or other goods for personal consumption. It is thus possible that donors treat charitable giving
as another voluntary consumption expenditure. This notion is
buttressed by the fact that donors receive a variety of benefits
in return for giving. Some are intangible, such as the “warm
glow” that accompanies a good deed, the signaling of wealth to
one’s community, or membership in certain social circles.67
Other benefits are more tangible, like the ability to enjoy an
opera or attendance at a benefit party.68
If charitable giving includes an element of consumption,
then some limits on charitable deductions should apply.69 This
base. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 21, at 219–20. To that end, Part II looks
only at a charitable deduction and a limit on that deduction based on one’s
AGI.
67. See John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax
Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657, 670–73 (2001); Gergen, supra note
14, at 1408, 1430; Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of
Gifts and Gratuitous Promises, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 567, 574 –77 (1997).
68. Colombo, supra note 67, at 670. See also COMM’N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY & PUB. NEEDS, GIVING IN AMERICA: TOWARD A STRONGER VOLUNTARY SECTOR 107–11 (1975); McNulty, supra note 17, at 236.
69. See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES
186–87 (1985); Bittker, supra note 5, at 165; Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of
Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 375–77 & n.169
(1989); Strnad, supra note 21, at 278–86; see also Mark G. Kelman, Personal
Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an “Ideal” Income Tax and Why
They Fit Worse in a Far From Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 849–51
(1979) (criticizing Andrews’s contention that charitable giving is not consumption in part because donors receive deference, respect, and attention); Stanley
A. Koppelman, Personal Deductions Under an Ideal Income Tax, 43 TAX L.
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conclusion, however, does not justify an AGI limit that prevents
someone from zeroing out her tax liability via charitable contributions. For several reasons, an AGI limit is an ineffective
means of reflecting the theory that charitable transfers may
contain elements of consumption.
First, it makes little sense to tie the amount of a transfer
that is treated as consumption to the portion of one’s AGI that
it represents.70 Let’s use the existing fifty-percent limit as an
example, although the reasoning would apply with equal force
to any other percentage limit.71 Tying deductibility to AGI in
this manner creates the following paradox: Someone who contributes forty-nine percent of her income to charity can deduct
the full amount; no portion of her gifts is treated as consumption. In contrast, once an individual donates more than half her
income to charity, an increasingly larger portion of her contributions is treated as consumption.72 While donations may have
different elements of consumption depending on the taxpayer’s
motives and the intangibles received in return, it is unlikely
that these are tied to the ratio of the size of the gift to AGI.
One might argue that the greater the percentage of income
you donate, the more you value charitable giving, and therefore, your donations have a larger element of consumption than
those of someone who donates a smaller share of her income.
But this explanation fails on both a theoretical and practical
level. On a theoretical level, it contradicts common understandings of marginal utility, which suggest that as contributions
increase, the utility derived from each additional contribution
decreases, instead of vice versa.

REV. 679, 707 (1988) (conceptualizing an ideal income tax as taxing the power
to consume and concluding that spending cash or property on charitable purposes “represents a clear personal benefit to the donor”).
70. Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 4, at 409.
71. I emphasize my goal is to explore whether—as a general matter—the
deduction should be limited to some portion of income and not whether the
existing limit as currently structured is justified. My criticism is of using any
percentage of AGI as a baseline, not of using fifty percent per se.
72. To illustrate: If a donor contributes sixty percent of her income to
charity, she can deduct five-sixths of the transfer, an amount equal to fifty
percent of her AGI. Only one-sixth of her transfer is treated as non-deductible
consumption. If she instead contributes seventy-five percent of her income to
charity, she can deduct only two-thirds of the transfer. In that situation, twice
as much of her transfer—one-third—is treated as non-deductible consumption.
Under this reasoning, the same $100,000 transfer has differing elements of
consumption based on what percentage of a donor’s AGI it represents.
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This “increasing consumption element” justification for the
cap is also problematic on a practical level. The Code is rife
with dual-character receipts or expenditures that simultaneously contain elements of personal consumption and of nonconsumption, such as employee fringe benefits and work expenses like clothing and commuting. Generally, the Code does
not differentiate consumption and non-consumption on any
type of basis unique to the taxpayer in question. Instead, it
generally determines the treatment of such transactions according to the type of transaction, rather than the taxpayer’s
characteristics.73
For these reasons, tying deductibility to the portion of a
donor’s AGI that a gift comprises is an inaccurate method of
measuring consumption. Moreover, the existence of other types
of limits that would better measure the amount of consumption
in a charitable gift suggests the inadequacy of precluding
someone from zeroing out her taxable income via the charitable
deduction on that ground.74 Two types of such potential limits
exist. First, limiting deductibility to some flat percentage of
each contribution (much like allowing a deduction of fifty percent for business meals)75 would reflect the idea that any charitable contribution contains both consumption and nonconsumption elements simultaneously, regardless of how many
other contributions a donor makes, her AGI, or the portion of
her AGI represented by any given contribution.
Second, such a limit would likely differ based on the charitable recipient. For example, it is likely that giving to an opera you regularly attend, to your child’s college, or to the local
museum in exchange for a wing with your name on it has a
greater element of consumption than giving to a soup kitchen
73. Dual-nature expenses and receipts, for administrative ease, are generally treated one of three ways: (1) as all consumption (commuting), cf. I.R.C.
§ 162(a)(2) (2000) (allowing a deduction for travelling expenses but not commuting); (2) as no consumption at all (most fringe benefits), see, e.g., id. § 132
(excluding various fringe benefits from income); or (3) the same portion of a
given transaction is treated as consumption for all individuals (business
meals), e.g., id. § 274(n) (allowing a deduction up to fifty percent of expenses
for business meals).
74. Obviously, much more can be said about whether and how to structure
limits on the charitable deduction that are designed to differentiate the consumption and non-consumption elements of a donation. My goal is neither to
critique that goal, nor to propose a structure for so doing. I make these observations by way of contrast to illustrate how a limit based on the portion of AGI
that a donation represents fails to do so.
75. Id. § 274(n).
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or tutoring center across town. Simply limiting one’s deduction
to some portion of one’s income in and of itself treats all charities equally, further suggesting that ferreting out consumption
does not satisfactorily justify such a limit.76
2. Moral Theory
Alternatively, percentage-of-income limits might be tied to
the notion that we have a moral duty to contribute to charity.77
Many religions hold that we have a duty to help those less fortunate, as do many secular conceptions of distributive justice.78
Bittker and others have argued that this moral duty should
preclude taxing charitable transfers on the theory that the involuntary nature of a required tithe or other charitable gift
means that it is not consumption.79
If required transfers are not consumption, one might argue
that additional transfers above and beyond what is required
are voluntary and therefore should be considered consumption.
This distinction, coupled with the obligations we have to the
broader community, might suggest the following: that a certain
percentage of your income is “God’s”80 money—not the government’s—on moral grounds and therefore should not be taxed,
but anything beyond that is fair game for taxation. Under this
reasoning, a limit based on the percentage of AGI a donation
represents might be justified as reflecting the contours of one’s
moral duty to give to charity. It is possible, however, that such
a limit would be lower than fifty percent, perhaps ten percent
to reflect traditional tithing requirements.
This line of reasoning, however, is problematic on two levels. First, it assumes that all charitable organizations have
equal moral worth and glosses over why a moral duty to give
exists in the first instance. For example, if religious tithing is
required to support one’s place of worship or because of a duty
to help the poor, then such donations have more moral weight
76. As explained in Part I, the current rules impose lower percentage limits on contributions to private foundations as opposed to public charities
(though they do not differentiate among public charities). Part IV.E. addresses
whether different limits are justified.
77. I thank Bill Klein for this suggestion.
78. For a readable account of these philosophies, see DANIEL M. HAUSMAN
& MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY
101–33, 174 –208 (1996).
79. E.g., Bittker, supra note 65, at 58–59.
80. See Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the
Charity Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585, 588–89 (1998).
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than donations say, to the opera. It is likely that some philosophies would consider certain charities to be morally superior to
others.81 For the reasons outlined in Part III.B.2, percentage-ofAGI limits are an inexact means of differentiating among the
worthiness of various charities.
Second, this type of limit favors some types of moral philosophies over others. For example, philosophies stemming
from organized religions often have set rules about how much
giving is required (such as tithing ten percent of one’s income).82 In contrast, many secular moral philosophies are much
less specific. They tend to speak in vague terms such as “having
a duty to ensure equality of welfare by giving to the poor,” but
generally do not specify what that duty entails.83 Indeed, there
is a long-standing debate about the best mechanisms for implementing these general philosophies.84 It is therefore impossible to know what amount of giving is required of individuals
subscribing to these secular philosophies—and therefore where
any percentage-of-income limit should be set. Tithing requirements are not helpful in this situation, for using them would
favor religious over non-religious philosophies. Therefore, although a case can be made that moral duty might justify percentage-of-income limits as a theoretical matter, practical considerations suggest that moral duty is not the strongest
justification for such limits.
III. THE SUBSIDY THEORY
Turning away from the base-measurement theory, this section analyzes whether limiting the charitable deduction to some
portion of one’s income makes sense under the subsidy theory.85
81. For a fuller exploration of how various accounts of distributive justice
would each shape the contours of the charitable deduction, see Miranda Perry
Fleischer, Charitable Justice (unpublished article on file with author).
82. For a description of Jewish tithing requirements, see generally Adam
S. Chodorow, Maaser Kesafim and the Development of Tax Law, 8 FLA. TAX
REV. 153 (2007).
83. Cf. HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 78, at 101–33, 174–208.
84. For example, many justify the estate tax on the grounds that moral
philosophy requires ensuring that everyone has an “equal opportunity.” Tax
scholars debate, however, what that means in terms of actually structuring an
estate tax. See, e.g., ERIC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL JUSTICE 143–49 (1991); Anne L.
Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARV. L. REV. 469,
476–85 (2007); David G. Duff, Taxing Inherited Wealth: A Philosophical Argument, 6 CAN. J.L. JURIS. 3, 45–57 (1993).
85. Because the current subsidy is structured as a deduction, my argument largely focuses on a deduction limited to some portion of one’s AGI. My
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It argues that such a limit is not justified by any of the reasons
that other tax scholars have previously suggested, such as preventing the wealthy from engaging in tax shelters, protecting
progressivity, or limiting the subsidy of “rich people’s charities.” Instead, I argue that under the economic theory for the
deduction, the structure of our legislative process compels such
a limit.
Under the subsidy theory, even if charitable transfers
should be taxed in a pure Haig-Simons world, a deduction is
justifiable as a tax expenditure to subsidize charitable activity.86 A variety of arguments abound as to why charities should
be subsidized. The more recent and probably more widely accepted explanation is grounded in economics: subsidizing charities is necessary to assist them in providing public goods that
would otherwise be under-produced due to market and governmental failures.87
The more traditional explanation is that subsidizing charities is “good” because of the benefits they provide.88 Some
theorists focus on the fact that charities relieve the government
of burdens it would otherwise have to bear (for example, poverty relief).89 Others emphasize the role charities play in providing creative and diverse solutions to society’s problems, or in
argument would apply with equal force to a credit limited to some portion of
one’s tentative tax liability.
86. The deduction subsidizes charity in the following manner. Imagine a
taxpayer in the thirty-five percent bracket who donates $100 to charity thereby receiving a $100 deduction. This deduction reduces her tax bill by $35,
meaning that she transferred $100 to charity at a net cost to her of $65. The
government has subsidized her transfer to the tune of $35. By lowering the
price of making charitable gifts, the subsidy is thought to increase a taxpayer’s
incentive to make them. See Gerald E. Auten et al., Taxes and Philanthropy
Among the Wealthy, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
OF TAXING THE RICH 392, 393 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000). Increased giving in
turn enhances the scope and activity of the charitable sector. The subsidy can
also be characterized as a matching grant from the government, which
matches each taxpayer’s donation with a grant equal to thirty-five percent of
that gift. Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 405 (1998).
From that perspective, taxpayers can be thought of as individually directing
the allocation of federal funds. See Bittker, supra note 65, at 39; Paul R.
McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A Substitute
for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REV. 377, 379–80 (1972). Giving a
taxpayer a thirty-five cent credit for every dollar donated has the same effect:
in that case, a taxpayer who gives $100 to charity would receive a $35 credit
with which to offset her tax bill, subsidizing her transfer by $35.
87. See Colombo, supra note 18, at 366; infra Part III.A.
88. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 5.
89. See id. at 45–58.
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offering alternative viewpoints in the arts and culture.90 Lastly,
some scholars highlight the role that nonprofits play in countering governmental power and enhancing pluralism.91
Although traditionalists rarely couch their explanations as
such, their rationales are grounded in the ideas of public goods.
To them, a vibrant charitable sector is a public good in and of
itself. Further, many of the good things traditionalists wish to
subsidize—such as the arts and poverty relief—are public or
quasi-public goods.92 Thus, the traditional and economic explanations for subsidizing charity do not differ as much as they
initially seem to.93 To that end, much of what follows addresses
both strands of the subsidy theory simultaneously.
A. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SUBSIDY THEORY
The subsidy theory for the deduction94 has three foundational blocks: (1) an economic analysis of the role of charities in
relation to for-profits and the government; (2) an explanation of
the need for a subsidy to assist charities in fulfilling that role;
and (3) the decision that the tax system is the best method of
providing that subsidy.95
1. Nonprofit Institutions, Market Failure, and Government
Failure
Both the traditional and the economic explanation of the
subsidy theory rest on the idea that the charitable sector generally provides public goods. Classic economic theory suggests
that the market will undersupply public goods96 due to free rid90. Cf. TERESA ODENDAHL, CHARITY BEGINS AT HOME 204–07 (1990) (discussing the promotion of social change through charitable arts organizations).
91. See, e.g., id. at 234; Bittker, supra note 65, at 39.
92. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 5–6.
93. See Colombo, supra note 18, at 367 (arguing that a test that focuses on
whether an organization increases a population’s access to services unavailable through private markets bridges the traditional and economic subsidy arguments).
94. This theory, which scholars use to explain the existence of both the
charitable deduction and the tax-exempt status of charitable organizations,
seeks to explain why we subsidize charities through the tax system at all. It
would therefore apply with equal force if the subsidy for donations was structured as a credit instead of a deduction.
95. See discussion infra Part III.A.
96. Gergen, supra note 14, at 1397 (“Two qualities define a public (or collective) good: one person’s consumption of the good does not reduce its availability to others (i.e., the good is nonrival or in joint supply); and no one can be
excluded from the good (i.e., the good is nonexclusive).”) (citation omitted).
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ing and positive externalities.97 Either the good remains undersupplied, or the government or nonprofit sector remedies the
market failure. Often, the government overcomes the market
failure in question by “coerce[ing] ‘purchase’ by everyone via
the power of taxation.”98 As explained below, however, in some
instances the government cannot or purposefully will not remedy the market failure.99 In that case, nonprofits step in to
help.
Existing literature suggests that government will remedy a
market failure by funding a given public good at close to optimal levels if demand for that good is relatively homogenous,
meaning that most voters demand roughly similar amounts of
the good.100 This argument first assumes that “governmental
decisions in a democracy are roughly shaped by the desires of
the majority of the electorate”101 and that the median voter determines the level at which government supplies a given public
good.102 It concludes that if demand for the good is relatively
homogenous, then the median voter’s demand for the good
97. Gergen explains, “Some people will refuse to pay for a good and rely
on others to sustain it. Their refusal discourages more conscientious people
from giving, because even conscientious people may not want to be taken advantage of by freeriders or they may despair of the possibility of successful
collective action.” Id. at 1398; see also COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 101
(“If I know that Sarah next door will pay to support the PBS program I watch,
there is no need for me to pay, as well, because once PBS sends out it [sic] signal, I can watch ‘for free.’”).
98. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 101; see also BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 20 (1988) (explaining that “government can
finance, subsidize, mandate, or otherwise encourage” remedies to market failures through its power of taxation). This coerced purchase precludes freeriding and ensures that individuals do not under purchase public goods with
large positive externalities. Once the government has coerced the purchase of
a public good, it can either provide the public good directly (e.g., Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF )), or subsidize others to do so (e.g., by
granting a charitable deduction for donations to a soup kitchen).
99. I argue below that the instances where government cannot remedy the
market failure illustrate the application of the economic strand of the subsidy
theory. The instances where the government will not remedy the market failure illustrate the traditional subsidy theory.
100. See, e.g., COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 101–13; Weisbrod, supra
note 10, at 23; cf. Gergen, supra note 14, at 1403 (arguing that the deduction
“better matches expense with preference in cases of collective goods for which
demand is universal but heterogeneous”).
101. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 102.
102. The majoritarian, median-voter framework described above is only one
possible description of the democratic process. See discussion infra Part IV.E
for an analysis of this issue using a nonmedian-voter framework.
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closely mirrors that of voters on each extreme.103 In such cases,
if the government supplies “enough” of a good to satisfy the
median voter, it will be very close to supplying “enough” to satisfy most other voters. Little unmet demand remains.104
In contrast, the government will be unable to overcome a
market failure when demand for a given public good is heterogeneous, and the amount each voter demands varies. If the
government supplies enough of the public good to satisfy only
the median voter, it will fall short of satisfying the highdemand minority—that is, those who demand more of a given
good then the median voter.105 I shall term this “accidental”
governmental failure. The high-demand minority, failed by
both the market and the government, must seek another solution to meet its demands.106 One solution lies in the nonprofit
sector. Individuals who demand more of a given public good
than the government produces often make voluntary donations
to nonprofits to produce the good at a satisfactory level.107
Some readers might object that the median-voter model is
flawed. I acknowledge this objection, and briefly explore other
models in Part IV.E. At this point, however, it is important to
take away from the model that the government, for some reason, cannot overcome a market failure. As Professors Colombo
and Hall have noted, the conclusion that high-demanders turn
to nonprofits in the face of government failure does not depend
on why a government failure occurred.108
In fact, the term “government failure” may sometimes be a
misnomer. This so-called failure may not always be bad. In
some cases, provision by a nonprofit may be preferable to governmental provision. Maybe the nonprofit sector provides the
good more efficiently or more creatively than the government.109 Perhaps voters wish to avoid sullying the good in ques103. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 102.
104. Weisbrod, supra note 10, at 22–26.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 26–32.
107. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 102; see also Weisbrod, supra
note 10, at 31 (arguing that the size of the voluntary sector in an industry is a
function of the heterogeneity of population demands).
108. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 102–03.
109. Cf. Atkinson, supra note 65, at 579 (suggesting that private nonprofit
suppliers may provide goods and services experimentally or informally). For
example, even voters who support traditional governmental antipoverty programs such as TANF may also recognize the value in having charities provide
supplemental mechanisms for reducing poverty. Charities may implement
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tion with the taint of coerced government funding, preferring
the moral purity of altruistic funding and production.110 Or
maybe voters recognize the importance of a strong nonprofit
sector that can serve as a check on government power and enhance pluralism.111 Lastly, sometimes the government cannot
produce the good in question for constitutional or other reasons,
as is the case with religious goods.112
In situations where provision of a good by a nonprofit is
preferable, voters may refuse to fund a public good—even at
levels supported by the median voter and even if demand is
fairly homogenous—on purpose. In other words, the refusal of
government to provide the public good may stem not from
shortcomings in the majoritarian process, but from reasoning
and deliberation. I shall term this “purposeful” government
failure.
2. The Role of Tax Subsidies
In the case of both accidental and purposeful government
failure, governmental refusal to provide the desired public
goods leads to production by the nonprofit sector. But why are
charities then subsidized by the government? If highdemanders could not convince the government fully to fund the
good (accidental government failure), why would the government agree to subsidize any of it? Alternatively, if highdemanders could have obtained full government funding but
chose to forego such funding (purposeful government failure),
why ask for any subsidies? And why implement the subsidy
through the tax system? Existing literature provides the following explanations.
a. Subsidies and “Purposeful” Government Failure
Recall that purposeful government failure occurs when an
affirmative decision is made to have the nonprofit sector rather
than government provide a given public good. Unfortunately,
alternative ways to reduce poverty that the government did not think of, or
charities may implement similar activities in a more efficient or appealing
manner.
110. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 102–03.
111. See ODENDAHL, supra note 90, at 234.
112. For an analysis of the constitutional limitations on government funding of religious entities and activities, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The
Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 21–30
(2005).
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the same free rider and externality problems that inhibit provision of these goods by the market also plague charities, making
it difficult for the charitable sector to fulfill the role envisioned
for it by traditionalists.113 Thus, it is necessary to help charities
overcome these issues without polluting the attributes that
make them preferable to government in the first instance.
Enter the charitable deduction: by lowering the cost of
supporting such institutions, free-rider problems decrease.114
By the same token, since the tax subsidy depends upon independent acts by nongovernmental actors, all the benefits of
nongovernmental provision are saved.115 In this manner, the
charitable deduction is a product of purposeful government
failure.
b. Subsidies and “Accidental” Government Failure
What about the case of accidental government failure? In
the median voter model conceptualized by existing literature,
why would the median voter agree to partial funding of goods
for which she refused to provide full funding?
Basic economic theory suggests one answer. As the price of
a good decreases, the amount demanded increases.116 By replacing full funding of a public good with only partial funding
via the deduction, cost is reduced, and the amount demanded
by the consumer/voter will increase.117 The median voter will
thus be willing to partially subsidize the good at greater levels
than she would be willing to subsidize it fully.118 In other
words, she receives some benefit from increased production of
the good in question— enough to pay a little more for it via a
tax subsidy but not enough to pay for all of it.119
113. Cf. Hochman & Rodgers, supra note 21, at 225 (arguing that the charitable sector is subject to free riders who benefit from goods and services
without making contributions).
114. See id. at 225–26 (arguing that relying exclusively on unsubsidized
voluntary donations increases free-rider problems and that preferential tax
treatment is one effective remedy). Nonprofits use a variety of additional tools
to reduce the free-rider problem, such as social pressure, donor recognition,
appeals to altruism and the like.
115. Cf. id. at 226 (arguing that nonprofit charities mitigate government
monopoly and promote creative projects). Many of the benefits described in
more detail in Part III.A.2.c. would also apply here.
116. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 107–08.
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 108; Weisbrod, supra note 10, at 36.
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A similar rationale is that the subsidy represents a bargain
among various taxpayers with minority interests.120 The median voter may agree to provide partial subsidies for public
goods from which she receives no direct marginal benefit so
long as she receives something in return—partial funding for
other public goods from which she will receive a benefit. In other words, disparate high-demanding minority groups coalesce
to form a majority that agrees to provide partial funding for
each other’s projects.
Professors Colombo and Hall have expressed taxexemption for charities in such terms:
Opera lovers are not willing to pay the full cost of the government
studying ruffled grouse and vice-versa; but many ruffled-grouse lovers wouldn’t mind paying a little for more opera, and many opera lovers wouldn’t mind paying a little for a bit of ruffled grouse study, especially if the bargain results in each group getting some help for its
own preferred interest. Because everyone who has a particular interest subject to government failure benefits from exemption, and because virtually all segments of society either have such an interest or
directly benefit from such an interest . . . exemption becomes a method for government to assist all of society in providing goods and
services that the private market cannot provide . . . and which the
government cannot fully provide directly because of structural deficiencies in the democratic system.121

Although Colombo and Hall were addressing subsidization
via tax exemption, the same reasoning applies to subsidization
via the charitable deduction (or credit). It also bears noting that
the above explanation is not meant to explain Congress’s motivation in implementing the deduction or the events that transpired when Congress did so. Rather, the theory’s proponents
believe that it helps illuminate the continued existence of tax
subsidies for charities: taxpayers implicitly recognize and ratify
post hoc the bargain it represents.122
c. Subsidies and Taxes
A question remains: why provide the bargained-for subsidy
via the tax system instead of governmental grants? As an initial matter, using a deduction or credit means that individual
taxpayers decide which charities receive the subsidies and how
large the subsidies should be.123 Tying the subsidy to the prefe120. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 108.
121. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 108 (citation omitted).
122. See, e.g., id.
123. See Halperin, supra note 5, at 7. A deduction acts like a matching
grant: When a taxpayer in the thirty-five percent bracket contributes $100 to a
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rences of individual taxpayers has several benefits. On a political level, this removes the decision about which projects partially to subsidize from the legislature, thus shielding those decisions from the vagaries of the legislative process and
diminishing the prospect of further government failure.124 The
matching grant aspect, moreover, means that the charities that
receive the most donations receive the largest subsidies. This
allows the subsidies to reflect the electorate’s enthusiasm for
given charities, which might not happen if the legislature—or
some agency to which Congress might delegate that decisionmaking authority—determined how much of a subsidy each
charity could receive.125 Moreover, the matching grant is triggered only by an affirmative sacrifice on the part of the taxpayer. Indeed, someone who makes a $100 donation and receives a
deduction is, even after the $35 drop in her tax bill, still out of
pocket $65.126 This out-of-pocket expenditure may spur taxpayers to think more carefully about which projects they fund and
to develop other commitments to those projects, such as volunteering.127
This structure also has economic benefits: it helps allocate
the costs of funding a given charitable good among taxpayers in
accordance with how much each taxpayer values that good.128
High-demanders pay “more” by making charitable contribugiven charity and receives a $100 deduction, it lowers her taxes by $35. She
and the government are now partners in the contribution. It has triggered a
$35 “match” from the government, thus allowing her to allocate $35 of federal
funds to the charity of her choice. Giving a taxpayer a $35 credit has the same
effect.
124. Some readers may wonder why the legislature would delegate decision
making in this way. Professor Saul Levmore offers two explanations. The pessimistic view is that Congress supported the charitable deduction because
nonprofits would be “frugal supplicants” and Congress had much to lose by
favoring some charities over others. The optimistic view is that the deduction
is a “precommitment” to discourage rent seeking that otherwise might occur.
Levmore, supra note 86, at 408.
125. See id. at 404 –05.
126. The same holds true if she instead were to receive a $35 credit.
127. See Halperin, supra note 5, at 8; Levmore, supra note 86, at 411, 427–
28.
128. See Gergen, supra note 14, at 1400–06 (citing Hochman & Rodgers,
supra note 21, at 228–35, 238; Strnad, supra note 21, at 271–75) (summarizing
what economists call the Lindahl solution, in which a collective good is funded
at a level where the marginal benefit received by both contributors and noncontributors alike equals their respective marginal costs). Economists disagree, however, as to whether a tax deduction or a tax credit is preferable. Compare Strnad, supra note 21, at 272–76 (supporting a deduction) with Hochman
& Rodgers, supra note 21, at 236 (supporting a credit).
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tions. Low-demanders pay “less” by not contributing directly,
but they still pay something. The subsidies funded by their tax
bills constitute smaller, indirect payments to charitable goods
chosen by high-demanders, reflecting the fact that lowdemanders do receive a small benefit from these goods.129 In
contrast, if the government raised taxes on all citizens to provide direct grants to charities, it is quite likely that very few
people’s taxes would rise in proportion to how much they valued the charitable good now subsidized.130
On the other hand, routing the subsidy through the tax
system may have some downsides. Some might argue that requiring a financial sacrifice from a taxpayer before allowing her
to direct federal funds is tantamount to a poll tax requiring
payment before voting.131 Others question the fact that since
the current subsidy is structured as a deduction, higherbracket taxpayers receive more of a “match” per dollar than
other taxpayers, and that non-itemizers receive no match at
all.132 Lastly, maybe this structure is undemocratic in that fewer citizens are able to influence the allocation of federal funds
in this manner than via conventional voting, since far fewer
individuals claim itemized charitable contributions on their tax
returns than vote.133 Perhaps setting limits on the ability of a
taxpayer to take a charitable deduction addresses these concerns.134
129. For a discussion of whether it is morally fair to force low-demanders to
subsidize such goods partially, see Gergen, supra note 14, at 1401 n.27. Here,
the bargain is considered fair because everyone has either the possibility of
channeling federal funds to his or her project or the possibility of benefiting
from others’ projects as a recipient of charitable goods and services.
130. See id. at 1402 (arguing that voters would be unlikely to support a
direct subsidy to nonprofits).
131. Levmore, supra note 86, at 406.
132. See infra Parts III.B. It may be, however, that non-itemizers implicitly
benefit from the bargain as recipients and patrons of nonprofit organizations.
See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 65, at 55–56; Strnad, supra note 21, at 269.
133. See Levmore, supra note 86, at 405–06. For example, approximately
seventy million people voted in the 2002 midterm election for the House of
Representatives. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2002: ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 5 (2003). In contrast, approximately forty million tax returns reflected
an itemized charitable deduction. Brian Balkovic, Individual Income Tax Returns, Preliminary Data, 2002, in 23 STATISTICS OF INCOME DIVISION, IRS,
SOI BULLETIN 6, 15 tbl.1 (Winter 2003–2004). However, these returns could
represent more than forty million people as some are joint returns from married couples.
134. Structuring the subsidy as a refundable credit would equalize the
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B. THE SUBSIDY THEORY AND EXISTING EXPLANATIONS FOR
PERCENTAGE-OF-INCOME LIMITS
Although the works discussed above help justify a tax subsidy for charitable contributions as well as explore its potential
flaws, none attempt to justify limiting that subsidy based on
one’s income (in the case of a deduction) or tax liability (in the
case of a credit).135 This section analyzes existing theories for
such a limit under the subsidy rationale and finds that they do
not hold up under scrutiny, requiring us to look elsewhere for
potential justification.
1. Protecting Progressivity
One common justification for the current limits—based on
their intended target of high income donors136—is that they answer the recurring criticism that the charitable deduction adversely affects progressivity because it is worth more to a higher-bracket taxpayer than a lower-bracket one.137 This raises the
question whether precluding a donor from zeroing out her tax
liability by making charitable deductions might protect progressivity. Perhaps doing so reflects the view that under the
traditional subsidy theory, any such subsidy must not adversematch given to all charitably inclined citizens, regardless of their tax bracket.
It would not, however, address the other criticisms levied at the deduction.
135. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 99 –113 (addressing whether
to have a subsidy in the first instance); Hochman & Rogers, supra note 21, at
238–40 (questioning whether the subsidy should be a deduction or a credit);
Levmore, supra note 86, at 404 –18 (asking whether the subsidy should flow
through the tax system); Weisbrod, supra note 10, at 34–37 (addressing
whether to have a subsidy in the first instance). I do not mean this as a criticism of the subsidy theory itself or of those scholars, who were simply asking
fundamental questions requiring analysis before any further scrutiny of the
deduction’s details could occur.
136. Although the limitations technically apply to taxpayers in all brackets, the legislative history suggests that Congress intended to curb the extent
to which the wealthy benefit from the charitable deduction. See H.R. REP. NO.
91-413, at 52–53 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1698–99; S.
REP. NO. 91-552, at 78–79 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2106–
07; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 91ST
CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 76
(Comm. Print 1970).
137. See MARILYN E. PHELAN & ROBERT J. DESIDERIO, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS LAW AND POLICY 376 (2003) (“The reason for annual limitations on
the amount of a charitable contribution deduction relates to our progressive
tax system and the worth of aggregating deductions in one year as opposed to
spreading such deductions over many years.”). I thank participants at the
2006 Junior Tax Scholars’ Workshop, University of Colorado, June 16–17,
2006, for this suggestion.
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ly affect progressivity in order for it and the nonprofit sector to
play the positive role envisioned by its proponents.138 Alternatively, perhaps such a cap might reflect a view under the economic subsidy theory that certain voters are willing to fund
others’ pet projects only so long as the overall progressivity of
the tax system is not impaired.139
As an initial matter, there is no reason to preclude a taxpayer from zeroing out her liability to preserve progressivity if
the subsidy is structured as a credit instead of a deduction.
This is so because credits have equal value to all taxpayers: a
tax credit of one dollar reduces the taxes of both a low-bracket
and a high-bracket taxpayer by one dollar, regardless of their
marginal rates.140 Non-refundable credits, of course, do not
benefit taxpayers without any tentative tax liability.141 However, any given credit could be made refundable, thus benefiting
such individuals.142
Protecting progressivity, therefore, plausibly justifies an
AGI limit only if the subsidy is structured as a deduction. This
is so because the criticism that the deduction hurts
progressivity stems from the “upside-down effect” inherent in
any deduction: because deductions reduce taxable income, they
are worth more to higher-bracket taxpayers than lower-bracket
taxpayers.143 To illustrate, imagine the following hypothetical
rate structure:
If taxable income is over:

But not over:

The tax is:

$0

$50,000

10% of the amount over $0

$50,000

$150,000

$5000 plus 25% of the
amount over $50,000

$150,000

No limit

$30,000 plus 50% of the
amount over $150,000

138. See Weisbrod, supra note 10, at 34–37 (discussing the traditional subsidy theory).
139. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 107–08 (discussing the economic subsidy theory).
140. See Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case
for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 24 (2006).
141. Id. at 53–55.
142. Id. at 56.
143. Id. at 24; Gergen, supra note 14, at 1405.
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Now imagine three taxpayers, Alex, Bonnie, and Christine,
who each make a $100 donation. Alex is in the fifty-percent tax
bracket; his donation reduces his tax bill by $50. Compare
Bonnie, who is in the twenty-five percent bracket: her deduction is worth only $25. Christine, who is in the ten-percent
bracket, is even worse off. Her taxes are reduced by only $10 for
every $100 that she contributes to charity. Taxpayers in higher
brackets thus receive more of a subsidy than those in lower
brackets. For this reason, many scholars feel that this upsidedown effect undermines progressivity.144 Perhaps by limiting
the deduction available to high-bracket taxpayers in any given
year, AGI limits protect progressivity.145
Protecting progressivity is a poor justification for AGI limitations for several reasons. Let’s use the existing fifty-percent
limit as an example, although the reasoning would apply with
equal force to any other percentage limit. First, such a limit
applies only to the extent a taxpayer’s charitable contributions
exceed fifty percent of her AGI. To continue the previous example, if Alex, Bonnie, and Christine each contribute less than
fifty percent of their income, exactly the same amount of progressivity results both with and without the limits: Alex’s benefit is twice that of Bonnie’s and five times that of Christine’s.146
Second, even when this type of limit does apply, it will not
always limit the magnitude of the upside-down effect because a
limit based on what portion of AGI a contribution represents
applies to taxpayers in all brackets.147 If Alex, Bonnie, and
Christine each give all their income to charity, Alex still rece144. See COMM’N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY & PUB. NEEDS, supra note 68,
at 108–09; STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 36 (1973); Gergen,
supra note 14, at 1405; Kelman, supra note 69, at 833 n.7, 856–58; McDaniel,
supra note 86, at 383. But see Griffith, supra note 69, at 363; Strnad, supra
note 21, at 271–72.
145. Two criticisms of the anti-progressive upside-down effect predominate.
The first is that charities favored by the rich are over-funded. See infra Part
III.B.2. The second criticism is that the wealthy are not paying “enough” tax
relative to their true ability to pay. See infra Part III.B.4 (discussing the primary concern of minimum tax issues). I address the concept of the upsidedown subsidy separately, however, because so many other commentators levy
it, without more, as a criticism of the deduction.
146. As currently structured, the general limit on the subsidy affects only
about one-fifth of donors claiming a charitable deduction, meaning that it has
no effect on progressivity eighty percent of the time. See supra Part II. Any
other percentage limit would also be under inclusive, although the percentage
of taxpayers affected would differ.
147. See supra Part I.
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ives the greatest tax benefit and Christine still receives the
least. In that case, all that AGI limits do is cut in half the
amount of the subsidy each taxpayer receives.148 This decreases
the nominal amount of Alex’s benefit compared to Christine’s
(instead of benefiting forty cents more per dollar than Christine, now he only benefits twenty cents more per dollar) but not
its proportional magnitude. He still benefits five times as much
as she does.
To illustrate, imagine that before applying the charitable
deduction, Alex’s income was $300,000; Bonnie’s was $100,000;
and Christine’s was $50,000. Using the example rates previously set forth, after applying the charitable deduction and the
AGI limitation with the previous corresponding rate structure,
Alex reduces his income from $300,000 to $150,000 and his tax
bill from $105,000 to $30,000. Bonnie’s income decreases from
$100,000 to $50,000 and her tax bill drops from $17,500 to
$5000. Christine’s income decreases from $50,000 to $25,000
and her tax bill drops from $5000 to $2500. By reducing Alex’s
tax bill by $75,000, his $300,000 contribution garnered a 25%
subsidy from the government. Bonnie’s $100,000 contribution
cut her tax bill by $12,500 and resulted in a 12.5% subsidy from
the government. Christine’s $50,000 contribution reduced her
tax bill by only $2500—a subsidy of only 5%. With or without
an AGI limitation, Alex receives a benefit that is five times as
large as the benefit that Christine receives.
This type of limit diminishes the proportional magnitude of
Alex’s benefit only if he is the only taxpayer affected by it. Assume, for example, that Alex donates all his income to charity
and Christine donates only half her income. In that case, the
proportional benefit that he enjoys compared to Christine diminishes (before, his benefit was five times as large as hers;
now it is only two-and-a-half times as large). Even then, however, this kind of limit does not erase the upside-down effect.149
To illustrate, first assume that Christine (still with an income of $50,000) contributes half her income to charity. Be148. The same reasoning applies if the limit was something other than fifty
percent, as it would reduce each taxpayer’s benefit by some other fraction.
149. In fact, the existing limits as currently structured only exacerbate this
problem. When incomes fluctuate over time, the current carry-forwards exacerbate the upside-down effect by essentially allowing income averaging. By
prohibiting full use of the deduction in Year 1, the limitations preclude that
deduction from soaking up income taxed at lower marginal rates. Instead, any
deduction that is carried-over comes off the top of the donor’s highest marginal
rate in the year used. See Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 4, at 412.
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cause the limits don’t apply in that event, she can deduct her
entire $25,000 contribution, resulting in a decrease in her tax
bill from $5000 to $2500. Consequently, she receives a tax benefit of ten cents for every dollar contributed. Next, assume that
Alex contributes all his $300,000 income to charity, thereby
triggering the AGI limit. In the year of contribution, he can deduct only half this amount, reducing his taxable income from
$300,000 to $150,000 and his tax bill from $105,000 to $30,000.
He now receives a $75,000 tax cut for making a $300,000 contribution, or a tax benefit of twenty-five cents for every dollar
contributed.
Limits based on the portion of AGI a contribution
represents thus protect progressivity only in very narrow circumstances and only in a limited manner. Because they apply
only when donations exceed the specified percentage of income,
they often do not impact progressivity at all. Moreover, even
when triggered, the limitations merely dampen, and do not
erase, the upside-down effect. Even if the charitable subsidy is
structured as a deduction, protecting progressivity is a poor
rationale for limiting the deduction to some portion of income.
The best remedy for the upside-down effect, as several scholars
have thoughtfully suggested, would be to replace the deduction
with a credit.150
2. Limiting the Subsidy of “Rich People’s Charities”
A similar potential rationale for limiting the subsidy available to any given donor also stems from the current provision’s
intended targeting of the wealthy.151 Perhaps the AGI limit minimizes the governmental subsidy of charities favored by the
wealthy, either as part of an affirmative decision about what
constitutes a proper charitable sector or as part of the bargain
about which charities to subsidize. This idea stems from the
well-documented fact that wealthier taxpayers generally donate to different types of charities than other taxpayers.152 The
former tend to favor colleges and universities, health institutions, and cultural institutions such as museums.153 In contrast, lower-income givers generally favor churches and other

150.
151.
152.
153.

See supra notes 145–48 and accompanying text.
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
Auten et al., supra note 86, at 403–06.
Id.
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religious organizations, federated campaigns, and social service
organizations.154
Why might limiting the subsidy of “rich people’s charities”
be desirable? Perhaps this desire reflects a belief that such organizations are less worthy of a subsidy because they lack a
strong redistributional component.155 Alternatively, maybe the
institutions and projects favored by the wealthy—even if as socially worthy as those favored by the non-wealthy—are already
sufficiently funded or perhaps even over-funded, rendering a
subsidy unnecessary or even inefficient.156
154. Id.
155. Subsidizing charity is often justified on the grounds that it helps redistribute income downward. See id. (citing ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF
PLURALIST DEMOCRACY 83 (1982)). However, not all charitable transfers redistribute equally. Id. (“The philanthropy of the wealthy serves many purposes,
but primarily it assists in the social reproduction of the upper class.”). Gifts to
Ivy League schools primarily benefit the wealthy students who comprise much
of the student bodies, while gifts to art museums primarily benefit the upper
and upper-middle class individuals who patronize such institutions. See id. In
addition, because health organizations are not required to offer charitable care
other than open emergency rooms, gifts to such institutions may also lack a
redistributive element. Colombo, supra note 18, at 347–48. Nevertheless, some
of the benefits from these types of contributions do extend beyond the wealthy:
elite schools provide scholarships, a passion for art is not limited to the wealthy, and all of society benefits from medical and scientific advances. ODENDAHL, supra note 90, at 232. While fully assessing the redistributional element
of such charitable contributions is outside the scope of this Article, it is plausible to suggest that many charitable donations by the wealthy do little to benefit the nonwealthy. See Miranda Perry Fleischer, Charitable Contributions in
an Ideal Estate Tax, 60 TAX L. REV. 263, 318 (2007) (exploring which types of
charitable transfers contain redistributive elements). Moreover, considerable
evidence shows that charitable dollars tend to stay “close to home” with respect to the socio-economic status of those benefiting from a given charitable
donation. See, e.g., Rob Reich, Philanthropy and Its Uneasy Relation to Equality, in TAKING PHILANTHROPY SERIOUSLY 27, 36–39 (William Damon & Susan
Verducci eds., 2006); ODENDAHL, supra note 90, at 232; Auten et al., supra
note 86, at 397–400, 406.
156. For example, evidence exists that capital projects in educational and
arts organizations are overfunded and that many university endowments are
much larger than necessary to achieve their goals. See Gergen, supra note 14,
at 1409 (commenting on overbuilding on college campuses due to “edifice complex”); Henry Hansmann, Why Do Universities Have Endowments?, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 3, 22 (1990) (“[The] average [university] had an endowment twice
as large as its current operating budget.”); John Hechinger, When $26 Billion
Isn’t Enough, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2005, at 1 (noting that the wealthiest colleges and universities are “so flush with cash that . . . philanthropy experts
are starting to wonder whether these schools really need more money”); Joe
Nocera, The University of Raising Big Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2006, at C1
(noting that over twenty-five universities are in the process of raising more
than $1 billion). It might also be desirable to target subsidies to charities pro-

198

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:165

These desires do not, however, provide a coherent normative justification for limiting a donor’s charitable subsidy to
some portion of her AGI (if a deduction is used) or her tentative
tax liability (if a credit is used). Assuming that there is some
merit to treating “rich people’s charities” less favorably than
other charities—and that workable distinctions could be drawn
between such charities—such a limit is an ineffective means of
implementing that principle for several reasons.
First, although there is often a link between donor income
and the charities favored, there are numerous exceptions.157
Trying to limit the subsidy given to a particular set of charities
by targeting the donors who tend to support them is both under- and over-inclusive. In addition to reducing the incentives
of wealthy individuals who desire to benefit the opera, it would
also reduce those of wealthy donors who want to support a local
social service agency. Similarly, it would leave untouched the
incentives of the non-wealthy who desire to support the ballet
or some other less-favored “rich person’s charity.”158
Second, even assuming that the size of a donor’s income is
a workable proxy for the charities benefited, limiting the subsidy based on percentage of AGI, instead of absolute AGI, is ineffective. A percentage-of-income limit, in and of itself, applies to
taxpayers in all brackets.159 Thus, it affects the incentives of a
low-bracket taxpayer to donate a large portion of his income to
the Salvation Army or his church as much as it affects the incentives of a high-bracket taxpayer to donate a similar share of
his income to Harvard or the opera.160
viding public goods that would not be provided absent a subsidy due to market
and governmental failure. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 109; Gergen,
supra note 14, at 1398. If operas, hospitals, and art museums would exist at
optimal levels without a subsidy, then why subsidize them? Perhaps, then,
limiting the ability of the taxpayers most likely to fund these projects and institutions is a roundabout attempt to remedy inefficient or unnecessary subsidization.
157. See Auten et al., supra note 86, at 403–06.
158. As demonstrated, limiting the deduction based on the donor’s income
fails to tailor the size of the subsidy given to various charities when the donor’s income is not a proxy for the charity favored. Consequently, if certain
charities are to be treated less favorably than others, a more exact solution
would be to vary the size of the allowable deduction (or credit) based on the
nature of the recipient charity. I offer these suggestions merely for comparison. My goal is not to propose a new structure for the deduction that does distinguish among charities, but simply to show the AGI limits fail to do so.
159. See supra Part I.
160. Comparing the current limits to other possible structures is useful to
demonstrate that a percentage-of-income limit fails to constrain the subsidy to
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Lastly, even as applied to wealthy donors, percentage-ofincome limits do a poor job of minimizing the subsidy given to
charities favored by the wealthy. Take the current fifty-percent
limit as an illustration. It applies only to the extent a donor
makes a gift exceeding half her income, leaving most gifts untouched.161 When it does apply, it treats the same $1 million
gift to the ballet differently depending on what portion of the
donor’s AGI the gift represents. If a donor with an AGI under
$2 million makes such a gift, some of the deduction is disallowed. But if a donor with an AGI larger than $2 million makes
the same gift, all of it is deductible. This means that sometimes
the wealthiest of the wealthy receive a greater subsidy for their
gifts—which is not what one would expect if the limits were
meant to limit the subsidy granted to such individuals.162
3. Backstopping the Preference for Donations of Appreciated
Property
It is also plausible that precluding a taxpayer from zeroing
out her income via charitable donations is justified to offset the
preference given to donors of appreciated property.163 With
some exceptions,164 donors can contribute property containing
substantial unrealized gain, receive a deduction based on the
property’s fair-market value (FMV), and use that deduction to
reduce taxable income from other sources (such as salary in-

“rich people’s charities.” A more direct way of limiting the subsidy given to
these charities would be to impose limits once a donor’s AGI exceeds some
absolute limit instead of imposing limits once a gift exceeds some portion of
the donor’s AGI. A similar structure could be applied if the subsidy was a credit, looking at a donor’s tentative tax liability relative to some absolute cut-off,
rather than looking at what portion of her tax bill her charitable credit
represented.
161. Given that donors plan around the limits, perhaps some giving to such
charities simply doesn’t take place. See Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 4, at
412. If so, then the limits would have some impact on the amount of subsidy
given to such charities.
162. The same argument would apply if the subsidy were structured as a
credit limited to some portion of a taxpayer’s bill.
163. See Andrews, supra note 59, at 373 (suggesting that the limits minimize this preference but acknowledging that they are a “crude way” of doing so);
Halperin, supra note 5, at 23–25 (suggesting that this preference influenced
the repeal of the unlimited deduction but concluding that limits would be unnecessary if “transfers of property did not allow gain to escape tax”).
164. For example, donors of tangible personal property unrelated to a recipient charity’s exempt purpose are limited to a deduction equal to basis. Halperin, supra note 5, at 1.
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come).165 Because of the realization requirement, this puts donors of appreciated property in a better position than donors of
cash.166 Maybe limiting the subsidy to some percentage of income or tax liability erases this preference.
To illustrate the preference given to donors of appreciated
property, compare Diane, who receives a salary of $1500, with
Ed, who receives a salary of $600 but also owns stock (with a
basis of $100) that appreciates by $900 during the year (to an
FMV of $1000). Economically, both are in the same position;
each is better off to the tune of $1500. Due to the realization
requirement, however, Diane’s taxable income is $1500, while
Ed’s is only $600. He will, however, pay tax on the unrealized
appreciation when he sells the property, thus putting him
roughly in the same position as Diane and making the Treasury whole when viewed over time.167
Now imagine that Diane contributes $1000 cash to charity
and can deduct that full amount. Using a flat thirty-five percent rate for illustration, her taxable income drops to $500, resulting in a tax bill of $175. Compare Ed, who donates his stock
with an FMV of $1000 and a basis of $100. If he can deduct the
full FMV, he ends up with no taxable income in the year of donation, owes no tax that year, and never catches up with Diane
since he has divested himself of the property before realizing
any gain from it. Not only is Ed never taxed on the unrealized
gain from the property donation, he is not taxed on his salary
income. And if he had other income as well, some of that would
be offset by the portion of the donation exceeding his salary income.168
Limiting donors to some portion of their AGI does not,
however, put Ed on equal footing with Diane. First, this type of
limit applies to donors of cash as well as property. If, for example, a fifty-percent limit applies to both Ed and Diane, the following happens. Based on her $1500 AGI, Diane can only deduct $750 of her $1000 cash contribution. This gives her
taxable income of $750 and a tax bill of $262.50. Based on his
165. See id. at 10–11.
166. Id. at 13–14.
167. Of course, Ed has enjoyed the time value of money in the meantime
and will likely enjoy preferential rates when he sells.
168. The same distortions would result if the subsidy was a credit based on
the full fair market value of donated property. Although the mechanics would
be different, the credit would still enable Ed to offset tax on salary and other
income.
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AGI of $600, Ed can only deduct $300 of his $1000 contribution.
This gives him taxable income of $300 and a tax bill of $105.
The relative preference given to Ed has lessened, but has not
disappeared. Ed will still never catch up to Diane, since he gave
away the property and will never realize gain from it.
Even limiting Ed to a smaller percentage of his AGI than
cash donors does not solve this problem. Take, as an example,
the existing rule limiting taxpayers like Ed to thirty percent of
their AGI. In that situation, Ed would only be able to deduct
$180 of his contribution. His taxable income would be $420 and
his tax bill would be $147, which is still lower than Diane’s tax
bill. Applying different limits to Ed and Diane minimizes the
preference, but does not erase it.169
The only way to erase the preference fully is either to (1)
limit Ed’s deduction to his basis170 or (2) allow him a FMV deduction but force Ed to realize and recognize gain upon donating appreciated property.171 In both situations, Ed would have
taxable income of $500, thus putting him on equal terms with
Diane.172
That each of these two alternatives erase the preference
given to donors of appreciated property more thoroughly and
more directly than percentage-of-income limits suggests that
this goal, standing alone, may not be the best justification for
these limits. Given that such limits do reduce the preference
somewhat, however, this goal may still provide some—but not
sole—support for precluding a taxpayer from zeroing out her
tax liability via charitable gifts.

169. Andrews, supra note 59, at 373. Structuring the subsidy as a credit
limited to some portion of tax liability yields the same result. The preference
given to Ed would lessen but not disappear, regardless of whether Ed and Diane faced identical or different limits.
170. In this situation, he would have gross income of $600 from his salary,
less a $100 deduction (the amount of his basis), yielding taxable income of
$500. If a credit was in place, this preference would be erased by calculating
the credit with respect to the property’s basis and not its fair market value.
171. Here, Ed’s gross income would be $1500 ($600 salary plus $900 gain
from the property), and he could take a $1000 deduction (the FMV of the property), giving him taxable income of $500. Alternatively, if a credit was used,
Ed’s gross income (and his tentative tax bill) would increase due to realization,
but his credit would be calculated on the full value of the property.
172. See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 5, at 24 –25 (“[T]rading an unlimited
deduction for constructive realization would substantially improve the equity
of the tax system.”).
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4. A Crude Alternative Minimum Tax
Of all the existing normative rationales for limiting someone’s charitable deduction to some portion of income, the notion
that doing so serves as an alternative minimum tax has the
most scholarly support.173 This support stems both from dissatisfaction with other potential justifications and from the legislative history of the existing caps.174
First, as Steuerle and Sullivan have noted, almost every
other existing justification for limiting the deduction based on
how much of one’s income a donation represents ends up in the
same place: reflecting, on some level, a desire to make sure that
people do not spend “too much” money on charitable projects
instead of paying taxes.175 For example, criticism of the upsidedown effect of the deduction often reflects a concern that the
wealthy are not paying “enough” tax relative to their ability to
pay.
The legislative history of the current caps also supports
this alternative minimum tax idea. As mentioned above, before
1969, an unlimited income tax charitable deduction was allowed under certain conditions. When Congress repealed this
allowance,176 it emphasized the unfairness of “allow[ing] a
small number of high-income persons to pay little or no tax on
their income.”177 The House Report explained that “[o]urs is
primarily a self-assessment system. If taxpayers are generally
to pay their taxes on a voluntary basis they must feel that
these taxes are fair. Moreover, only by sharing the tax burden
on a fair basis is it possible to keep the tax burden at a level
173. See, e.g., MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 190
(10th ed. 2005) (“[The] limit shows that Congress was unwilling to permit the
very rich to reduce their taxes to zero by turning over their entire incomes to
charity and living out of savings.”); JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ,
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 936 (3d ed. 2006) (“The
limitations reflect a judgment that no taxpayer should completely avoid federal income tax by making charitable contributions.”); Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 4, at 414 (“[The cap] most likely is meant to address concerns analogous to those used to motivate a minimum tax—namely, no taxpayer should be
able to eliminate his or her entire tax liability through a combination of deductions, credits, and exclusions, no matter how meritorious their purpose.”).
174. Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 4, at 408.
175. Id. at 414.
176. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(b), 83 Stat. 487,
550–53 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 170(b) (2000).
177. H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, at 152 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1645, 1698.
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which is tolerable for all taxpayers.”178 The Senate Report
echoed these concerns,179 as did the Joint Committee’s Explanation, which noted that “[i]t appeared that the charitable contributions deduction was one of the two most important itemized deductions used by high-income persons, who paid little
or no income tax, to reduce their tax liability.”180
While this justification is more sound than other existing
rationales, it does not go far enough. It does not address what,
exactly, is unfair about allowing an individual to donate all of
his income to charity instead of paying tax. The rationale behind the AMT is the concern that in its absence, some individuals could retain substantial economic income for their own use
that would go untaxed due to tax preferences incentivizing activities deemed beneficial to society.181 For example, one oftrepeated justification for the AMT’s passage in 1969 was a Mrs.
Dodge, who received $1 million of untaxed income from taxexempt municipal bonds.182 While the preference for taxexempt bonds183 is thought to benefit society by subsidizing
state and local government activity, it also directly benefits the
individual holders of such bonds, who receive the income taxfree.184 As such, a preference for some municipal bonds is disallowed in the AMT.185
Many other preferences available under the regular tax
system but not available under the AMT also directly benefit
the taxpayer claiming the preference while benefiting society at
large. For example, § 179186 expensing and accelerated depreci-

178. Id. at 1, reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645.
179. S. REP. NO. 91-552 at 79 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027,
2108.
180. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 91ST
CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 76
(Comm. Print 1970).
181. See Michael J. Graetz & Emil Sunley, Minimum Taxes and Comprehensive Tax Reform, in UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPTION TAX 385, 387–88 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1988).
182. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 21, at 768.
183. I.R.C. § 103 (2000).
184. See generally Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax
Theory: Do Misallocations Drive Out Inequities?, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 19 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980) (acknowledging that
holders of tax-exempt bonds receive income free of federal income tax, even if
that benefit is less than it first appears due to tax capitalization).
185. See I.R.C. § 55(b)(2)(B) (2000).
186. I.R.C. § 179 (West Supp. 2008).
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ation under § 168187 both benefit society by spurring investment activity, but also benefit the taxpayer in question by offsetting otherwise taxable income retained for personal use.188
To preclude a taxpayer from fully offsetting such income in that
manner, the AMT requires the use of a less-accelerated depreciation schedule.189 The AMT thus targets tax preferences that,
although benefiting society, still enable individuals to shelter
income that they actually retain and use for their own benefit.
At root, it is the fact that individuals retain untaxed income for
their own benefit that triggers minimum tax concerns, not the
use of a deduction in and of itself.190
In contrast, true charitable contributions do not benefit the
donor the same way the tax preferences described above do. By
definition, if one gives money to charity, one does not retain it
for her own use.191 A complex web of rules that applies to both
public charities and private foundations is designed to prevent
taxpayers from (1) creating “sham” charities that benefit donors and other private individuals instead of the community at
187. Id. § 168.
188. Cf. Gerard M. Brannon, Tax Expenditures and Income Distribution: A
Theoretical Analysis of the Upside-Down Subsidy Argument, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION, supra note 184, at 87, 97 (stating that accelerated depreciation and exclusions encourage high-income individuals to invest by providing a
higher rate of untaxed return).
189. See I.R.C. § 56 (2000).
190. That said, in some respects, the tax preferences mentioned above
share one characteristic with the charitable deduction: it could be argued that
in all cases, the taxpayer is being rewarded with a deduction for doing something “good” with his money (be it helping charity, spurring investment, or
assisting localities). To that end, the argument in Section V of this Article may
also apply to justify limits on other tax preferences as well. For example, perhaps the AMT’s disallowance of accelerated depreciation reflects a compromise among various groups with different preferences concerning the level of
business subsidies. Alternatively, the arguments in Section V of this Article
may justify expanding the AMT to cover charitable donations as an alternative
to limiting the charitable deduction standing alone. Although this Article concludes that these arguments counsel for percentage-of-AGI limits on the deduction as opposed to other types of stand-alone limits within the charitable
deduction provisions, it does not assess the relative merits of implementing
these theories within the charitable deduction versus within the AMT.
191. As explained supra Part III.B.3, allowing donors of appreciated property to deduct the full FMV of such property allows them to use a deduction to
offset income that they actually retain for their own benefit. Although the
AMT briefly disallowed a charitable deduction for untaxed appreciation in the
mid-1980s, it contains no such remedy today. And, while precluding a donor’s
ability to deduct the full fair market value of appreciated property may well be
a valid goal, AGI limits are an ineffective means of reaching that goal. See
supra Part III.B.3.

2008]

FAIR SHARES AND CHARITABLE GIVING

205

large and (2) reaping personal gain from charities that do benefit the public.192 As with any anti-abuse rule, however, organizations and taxpayers sometimes purposefully evade these
rules, allowing donors to reap direct benefits from charities to
which they have contributed.193 In fact, such abuses likely motivated the enactment of both the AMT and substantial reforms
of the rules governing charities in the 1969 Tax Reform Act.
Such abuses cannot, however, justify using percentage-of-AGI
limits today as a means of taxing individuals who retain otherwise exempt income for their own benefit. To the extent that
the current anti-abuse rules allow manipulation by taxpayers,
they should be tightened. Alternatively, if the rules are clear
but simply ignored, the rules should be more stringently enforced. Limiting a donor’s ability to take a deduction based on
the percentage of income the gift represents is an over-broad
means of remedying such abuses.
Keeping these anti-abuse rules in mind and viewing the
purposes of a minimum tax in the light described above, the
question still remains: what is unfair about allowing an individual, who does not retain income for her own use but instead
donates it all to charity, to pay no income tax?
a. Benefit Theory
One oft-mentioned possibility is that everyone should pay
some tax because everyone benefits from certain goods provided
by the government: roads, sidewalks, national defense, fire protection, and so on. The problem with this argument, however, is
that there is generally no link between taxes paid and benefits
received.194 On a theoretical level, it is hard to determine how
much someone benefits from the government. Take police pro192. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(C) (West Supp. 2008) (precluding a deduction for contributions to public charities in which the net earnings inure to the
benefit of private individuals); I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) (requiring “no private
inurement” to maintain tax-exempt status); I.R.C. § 4941 (West Supp. 2008)
(imposing very strict limitations on transactions between private foundations
and their founders and donors); Id. § 4958 (imposing an excise tax on public
charities and individuals engaging in acts of private inurement deemed not
severe enough to warrant loss of exemption).
193. See, e.g., Walter V. Robinson & Michael Rezendes, Foundation Chief
Agrees to Repay Over $4M, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 16, 2004, at A1 (reporting the
result of a 2003 Boston Globe investigative series on financial abuses at charitable foundations that resulted in sanctions against Paul C. Cabot, Jr. for
draining foundation funds for personal use).
194. See Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 451–55 (1952).
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tection. Do all citizens benefit equally? Do the poor benefit less,
because the property protected is worth less? Or do they benefit
more, because they are unable to afford private security?195 On
a more administrative level, there is no attempt to match taxes
paid with benefits received. An individual’s taxes fund the fire
department regardless of whether he or she ever calls them; if
called, the fire department would respond without regard to
whether or how much tax an individual paid. Without more
context, then, the argument that everyone should pay some tax
because everyone benefits from government does not justify
limiting the extent to which a given individual can receive a
deduction (or credit). The tax system is based on ability to pay,
not benefits received.
At this point, some readers may argue that all citizens
benefit from the provision of public sidewalks, for example, and
if enough citizens did not pay any tax, then public sidewalks
might be under-funded. This argument basically restates the
proposition that public sidewalks are subject to free-rider problems in the market, thus requiring government taxation to
overcome this problem. The possibility that the government
may lack enough funds to pay for the sidewalks leads to the
dual-majority bargain proposed in Part IV. Other readers may
argue that the benefit theory is not predicated on the purchase
of specific public goods by a taxpayer, but rather on the purchase of “civilization.” Therefore, since everyone benefits in
some fashion or another, everyone should pay something.
Again, however, this raises the question of why, if you are already “paying” for civilization by giving all your money to a
charity that provides some type of social good, should you pay
again in the form of taxes? The next article in this series answers that question.
b. Optics
A second oft-mentioned possibility is that it just seems unfair to allow some individuals to escape taxation completely—
195. Compare id. (arguing that a progressive tax is unjustified because no
greater benefit is conferred upon higher-income individuals as opposed to lower-income individuals such that the rate at which those benefits increase could
be calculated and made proportional to the rate at which income would be
taxed) with Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465, 491–97
(1987) (arguing that even though the taxes paid and benefits conferred cannot
be directly correlated, higher-income individuals benefit from taxes more significantly than lower-income individuals).
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even if they retain no income for their own use. Perhaps precluding taxpayers from zeroing out their tax liability by making
charitable gifts can therefore be justified on the grounds of optics: allowing someone to pay no tax “undermines public confidence in the tax system by inducing widespread perceptions of
tax inequity.”196 This perception of unfairness might encourage
more taxpayers to find ever-increasing ways of avoiding taxes
by engaging in tax shelters or simply not reporting income.197
As with the traditional alternative minimum tax argument, however, this reasoning does not go far enough. It does
not address what, exactly, seems unfair about not taxing individuals who have voluntarily donated all their income to a
cause that by definition benefits the general public. Such individuals are benefiting society just as much, if not more, than
individuals who do not contribute to charity but pay taxes.198
Again, traditional tax policy arguments for a minimum tax do
not address this point.199 The next section seeks to do so.
VI. A BETTER TAX POLICY JUSTIFICATION: THE DUALMAJORITY BARGAIN
A more compelling rationale for precluding charitable donors from zeroing out their tax liability with their gifts can be
found by revisiting the economic strand of the subsidy theory in
the context of our political system. As previously described, the
subsidy theory conceptualizes charitable tax subsidies as a bargain among various voters to overcome simultaneous market
and government failures.200 As detailed below, I suggest that
limiting the subsidy for donations is a necessary second bargain
(what I call the “dual-majority bargain”) that enables the initial
bargain to hold. Limiting the deduction or credit is the classic
196. Graetz & Sunley, supra note 181, at 388.
197. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 21, at 28; see also JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH 47 (1987) (detailing
the passage of the Tax Reform Act in 1986, done in large part to fight such
happenings).
198. Take two taxpayers with incomes of $100,000. The first makes no donations and pays $35,000 in tax, which, broadly speaking, benefits the public.
If the second donates all her income to charity, then she pays $100,000 (far
more than the first taxpayer!) toward projects that also, broadly speaking,
benefit the public.
199. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 65, at 62 (“If a taxpayer contributes 100
percent of his income to charities, it is preposterous to suggest his character
will suffer if he does not pay ‘some’ amount in taxes.”).
200. See supra Part III.A.

208

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:165

majority’s way of making sure that its priorities in the democratic process are funded even if it agrees to partially subsidize
minority projects via the deduction.
The dual-majority bargain provides a better tax policy justification for limiting the charitable subsidy available to a given
donor. As a matter of the subsidy’s structural logic, limiting
one’s deduction based on what portion of one’s income it
represents (or limiting a credit based on what portion of one’s
tax bill it represents) is at least as good as, and likely better,
than other possible limits in achieving this goal. As a matter of
broader tax policy goals, however, such a limit balances two
goals that are sometimes in tension: maximizing the subsidy
given to charity and addressing the unfairness resulting from
allowing some individuals to fund only their preferred vision of
the public good and none of the vision of the public good set by
their fellow citizens in the democratic process.
A. LIMITING GENEROSITY TO UPHOLD THE BARGAIN THAT
MAKES THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION POSSIBLE: THE “DUALMAJORITY BARGAIN”
My justification for precluding taxpayers from zeroing out
their taxable income via charitable gifts stems directly from
existing literature discussing the bargain among minority taxpayers who coalesce to create a majority for purposes of approving a tax subsidy in the first instance.201 Recall that Colombo
and Hall posited that opera lovers would be willing to work
with ruffled grouse lovers so long as they were repaid in
kind.202 Once opera lovers and ruffled grouse lovers strike this
bargain and form a new majority willing to approve partial
subsidies via the charitable deduction,203 two majority groups
simultaneously exist. The “classic majority” represents the majority in which the median voter approves the lighthouse, national defense, or other projects not subject to government failure. The “new majority” represents the new group that has
201. See supra Part III.A.
202. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 108.
203. I reiterate that this theory does not attempt to explain what actually
happened in Congress when it implemented the deduction. Rather, this theory
attempts to justify the continued existence of a deduction or other subsidy:
people allow it to continue because they implicitly recognize they will lose
something if it is repealed. Similarly, the dual-majority bargain theory is not
an attempt to explain what actually occurred when Congress passed the limits. Rather, it attempts to justify their continued existence.
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coalesced to help fund its members’ pet projects.204 By definition, some voters are members of both majorities simultaneously.
Another bargain must now be struck between these two
majorities (with members who belong to both majorities weighing their competing desires), and this bargain is represented by
limiting the subsidy for charitable donations. The classic majority will agree to subsidize the opera or the ruffled grouse, but
only if the new majority also agrees to contribute something to
the lighthouse or national defense. Existing literature ignores
this second bargain, which I term the “dual-majority bargain.”
Without that second bargain, high-demanders could substitute completely their view of the public good for the view initially set by the classic majority in the traditional democratic
process. A cap on the subsidy for charitable donations ensures
that such individuals may have government subsidize their
view of the public good, but only if, in return, they also subsidize the goods demanded by the classic majority. Without the
cap, the bargain among the two majorities might falter, and the
newly formed majority that has agreed to subsidize its members’ minority projects might unravel.
To take an extreme example, imagine a society in which a
new majority has approved a charitable deduction (or credit)
under the bargaining model described above. Next, assume that
two diseases exist in this society, A and B. Disease A kills only
a handful of people each year; Disease B kills thousands. Majoritarian preferences as determined by the median voter (the
classic majority) will likely fund governmental research on Disease B, but not Disease A. Now suppose the wealthiest member
of this society, Francie, has a brother who suffers from Disease
A, and Francie accordingly makes a large donation to a charity
to fund research on Disease A.205

204. I acknowledge that in some instances, preferences other than those of
the majority may control the legislative process. Because existing literature
uses a majoritarian model, I use that as my starting point. I explore other
possible models in Part IV.E.
205. This is, of course, an extremely stylized example. Some readers may
prefer to think of Disease B as representing all of the projects not suffering
from government failure that the classic majority agrees to fund, and Disease
A as representing other projects that Francie believes better contribute to the
public good broadly speaking (whether such projects, as explained supra note
14, are true public goods, impure public goods, or other projects providing a
public benefit).
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Giving Francie an unlimited deduction allows Francie to
undercut the preferences of the classic majority: theoretically,
she could pay no taxes at all and thus fund none of the research
on Disease B.206 If Francie’s tax revenues would otherwise
comprise a substantial portion of the community’s revenue, this
would drastically reduce revenue available to fund research on
Disease B.207 Francie could thus override the preferences expressed by the classic majority to fund research on Disease B. If
that were possible, it is unlikely that enough members of the
classic majority would join those individuals seeking partial
subsidies for minority projects to form the new majority.
A cap on the deduction allows both majorities to exist simultaneously. The classic majority agrees to subsidize activities that it does not prioritize (Disease A), but only if individuals whose preferences are partly subsidized (that is, members
of the new majority) also agree to support the majority’s preferences (Disease B) by paying some tax.208 This bargainpreserving role justifies the need to prevent taxpayers from zeroing out their tax liability by making charitable gifts.
B. RECOGNIZING THE DUAL-MAJORITY BARGAIN RENDERS
PREVIOUSLY INADEQUATE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AGI LIMITS
SATISFACTORY
Focusing on the dual-majority bargain better answers the
questions unresolved by existing justifications for precluding a
taxpayer from zeroing out her tax liability via charitable gifts.
Recall that Part III.B argued that many of those justifications—for example, the notion that the limits might enhance
progressivity or serve as an alternative minimum tax—were
not satisfying because those explanations did not answer the
206. That is, fund none of the government projects desired by the classic
majority.
207. Due to the distribution of the tax burden, this is not an impossible
scenario. In 2002, for example, the top ten percent of taxpayers paid over sixty-two percent of federal income taxes. It may be unlikely, however, given the
government’s ability and propensity to borrow to finance deficit spending. See
GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 21, at 22.
208. Although the model I have set forth to this point envisions the classic
majority as being comprised of individuals voting to fund government projects
directly, some members may also be individuals who derive other indirect subsidies from the tax system and therefore have a reason to ensure that funds
continue to flow into that system. See Roger Lowenstein, Who Needs the Mortgage Interest Deduction?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., March 5, 2006, at 78 (noting the
resistance of real-estate developers to eliminating the mortgage-interest deduction).
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question of why those goals matter. Why make sure the rich
pay “enough” tax even if they make large charitable gifts? Why
make sure everyone pays some tax in addition to making donations that fund public goods? The optics argument explored in
Part III.B.4 attempted to answer those questions by arguing
that it “seemed unfair” to exempt from tax someone who donates all her income to charity. This justification, standing
alone, still does not go far enough: why does not taxing people
who donate all their income to charity seem unfair?
Conceptualizing the dual-majority bargain helps answer
these questions. An unlimited charitable deduction (or credit)
would allow some individuals to fund only their preferred vision of the public good and none of the government’s vision of
the public good. Taken to an extreme, this could leave the government without enough revenue for its own projects. Limiting
the charitable subsidy achieves two goals: (1) ensuring the government has enough revenue to fund its own priorities and (2)
precluding individuals with minority preferences from undermining the preferences of the majority. Taxpayers must fund
the government’s specific priorities (and not just the public
good, broadly speaking) so that individuals with the ability to
make large donations cannot undercut the legislative process
and leave the government’s projects underfunded.
The congressional hearings on the 1969 reforms that repealed the unlimited deduction reflect this concern. It appears
that some legislators were concerned about the ability of wealthy people, through charitable contributions that completely
erased tax liability, to supplant governmental decisions about
which goods and services should be provided to the public at
large and to insert their own decisions about what should be
provided. For example, one legislator arguing for the AGI limits
bemoaned the fact that the wealthy could control what services
are to be provided while “the great mass of the American
people . . . have to pay for what the great, large, big Government decides are the services they are going to render.”209
Another argued, “We are really concerned over the ability of a
few individuals to actually appropriate what I would call Federal funds, because these funds have been short-circuited from
the Treasury and are under the control of these few wealthy
209. Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions: Hearings on Tax Reform
Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong. 1571 (1969) (statement
of Rep. Byrnes).
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individuals who decide which goods and services should be provided.”210
The legislative debates illuminate the core of the optics argument. Even if wealthy individuals contribute to society
through charitable contributions, their choice to give to charity
in lieu of paying taxes could leave the government without
enough funds for its own projects. It is the ability to singlehandedly override the preferences of one’s fellow citizens that
seems unfair.211 Precluding an individual from zeroing out her
tax liability via charitable contributions ensures that everyone
contributes something to what his or her fellow citizens deem
good and prevents individuals from undermining the decisions
made in the legislative process. The next article in this series
will argue that liberal democratic theory also justifies this kind
of limit and that the alternative would, as a matter of political
theory, be unfair and inconsistent with our democratic structure.
C. IMPLEMENTING THE DUAL-MAJORITY BARGAIN
Identifying the need for a dual-majority bargain, however,
does not necessarily justify—as a matter of the deduction’s
structural logic—limiting the deduction to some portion of the
donor’s AGI. Three types of limits might, as a structural matter, ensure that the classic majority maintained enough funds
for its own projects: (1) AGI limits, (2) caps on the portion of
each contribution that is deductible, or (3) absolute dollar ceilings on the amount a given individual could deduct in a given
year.212 Thus, percentage-of-income limits are justified as a
means of implementing the dual-majority bargain only if they
210. Id. at 1577 (statement of Rep. Utt, Member, H. Comm. on Ways and
Means).
211. See George F. Break, Charitable Contributions Under the Federal Income Tax: Alternative Policy Options, in COMM’N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY
AND PUB. NEEDS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, RESEARCH PAPERS 1521, 1524
(1977),
available
at
http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/
content_storage_01/0000019b/80/31/88/5f.pdf (suggesting that limits on the
charitable deduction may be justified because “permitting [some privileged
individuals] to contribute only to their own privately chosen public goods while
everyone else has to contribute to collectively chosen public goods is an option
of dubious merit”); Buckles, supra note 5, at 985–86.
212. If the subsidy were via a credit rather than a deduction, the parallel
limits would be (1) a credit limited to some portion of tentative tax liability, (2)
percentage caps on the portion of a given contribution that was creditable, or
(3) absolute dollar ceilings on the amount of credit any given individual could
use in a given year.
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are the most appealing of these three options to those involved
in the bargain.
A simple analogy helps illustrate the pros and cons of each
of these three limits. The two majorities are really bargaining
about how to split the governmental “pie” that is available to
fund public goods. The pie is comprised of two ingredients: taxes received by the government for projects it conducts directly
and the subsidy given to charitable projects via foregone revenue from the charitable deduction. At some point, the two majorities reach an agreement about what share of the pie each
receives, and, for administrative reasons, this will likely be expressed in a fraction: maybe one side gets one-third and the
other two-thirds, maybe one side gets one-fourth and the other
three-fourths, or maybe they agree to split the pie equally.
Assume, for illustration, that the two majorities agree to
an equal, fifty-fifty split. This division provides a simple model,
and, although it is not inevitable, it is quite plausible.213 As a
starting point, recall that in describing the initial bargain for
the charitable deduction, Colombo and Hall posited that opera
lovers are willing to scratch the backs of ruffled grouse lovers
so long as the favor is returned.214 Arguably, that initial bargain among the minority taxpayers who coalesce to form the
new majority is maintained over time only if the backscratching is roughly equal.215
Similar reasoning plausibly applies to the second bargain
between the classic and new majorities that leads to a limited
deduction. In that interaction, a feasible, attractive end point is
213. See infra note 215.
214. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 108.
215. The arbitrary determination of a fifty-fifty split is not the only result
that will enable the bargain to hold. However, several experiments on rational
choice, as well as empirical evidence from actual bargaining situations, show
that a fifty-fifty split is often used. Plausible explanations are that such a split
accords with common intuitions of fairness and is an “easy” fraction to understand, rendering it a convenient number to use when reaching a compromise.
See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV.
1051, 1135 (2000) (describing the “ultimatum game,” in which one person is
asked to split money between himself and a stranger who can either accept the
offer or reject it and receive nothing, and finding that the first player will often
use a fifty-fifty split to divide the money even though it is not in his best interest to do so); H. Peyton Young & Mary A. Burke, Competition and Custom in
Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture, 91 AM. ECON. REV.
559, 560–63 (2001) (citing empirical studies of crop-sharing farming contracts
ranging from Illinois to India where a fifty-fifty split between landlords and
tenants is most common, regardless of the parties’ relative bargaining powers).
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that each majority bargains for the possibility of an equal
amount of government funding for its preferred projects.216 In
this scenario, the classic majority agrees to the partial subsidies desired by the new majority, and vice versa, but only if
they split the available subsidies equally.
With respect to charitable gifts, this means that individuals with strong minority interests can have their projects subsidized up to the point where that subsidy equals the amount
they pay in taxes that fund the classic majority’s projects, but
no more.217 Returning to our previous example, Francie is allowed to take a charitable deduction of $100 (funneling $35 to
Disease A) so long as she pays taxes on $100 (funneling $35 to
Disease B).218
This means that a bargain has been struck whereby the
new majority is allowed to use half the pie for its pet projects,
but no more. The other half must go to the government to fund
its projects. Of course, members of the new majority might
choose to forego some or all of their half of the pie, but the key
is that they have bargained for the option to have half the pie.
The question then becomes: what type of limit best ensures
that the new majority can obtain as much of its bargained-for
half of the pie as it desires?219 As explained below, AGI limits
best protect that bargain.
1. Per-Taxpayer Dollar Ceilings and the Dual-Majority
Bargain
Applying a dollar ceiling on any given individual’s deduction splits the pie down the middle only in extremely narrow
circumstances. To illustrate, first think about the pie in the aggregate as comprised of the gross personal income tax revenue
collected in a year, without regard to any single taxpayer’s con216. For the classic majority, the funding comes from tax revenue that
funds the projects approved by the median voter. For the new majority, the
funding comes in the form of reduced taxes due to the charitable deduction (or
credit).
217. For the reasoning just described, a fifty-fifty split is not the necessary
endpoint for this bargain either, although it is a plausible one.
218. If the subsidy were structured as a thirty-five cent credit for every
dollar donated to charity (which would be comparable to a dollar deduction for
every dollar donated), Francie would be entitled to a credit of $35, so long as
she paid $35 in taxes.
219. While this paper employs a fifty-fifty split for purposes of illustration,
the arguments would apply with equal force to any other division of the pie to
which the two majorities might agree.
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tributions. Imagine that the total AGI of all the taxpayers in
this simplified world would be $3 million, yielding a pie of approximately $1 million (using a flat thirty-five percent rate for
simplicity and rounding).220 This means that after a bargain to
split the pie equally has been struck, the new majority should
get up to $500,000 in subsidies for its projects.
Per-person dollar ceilings reflect this division only in a
static world. For example, consider a per-person ceiling that, in
the aggregate, allowed taxpayers to deduct up to $1.5 million
(that is, half of the total AGI of $3 million), thus splitting the
pie down the middle.221 One could simply divide the aggregate
allowable deduction of $1.5 million by the number of taxpayers
in this hypothetical world to arrive at the “correct” per-person
ceiling. If there were ten taxpayers, each should be allowed to
deduct up to $150,000; if this world contained fifteen taxpayers,
each should be allowed to deduct up to $100,000, and so on.222
If, initially, there are ten taxpayers and each is allowed to
deduct up to $150,000, an aggregated deductible limit of $1.5
million results. If the society’s total AGI increases but the perperson limit stays the same, then the new majority does not get
its bargained-for half of the pie. It gets $1.5 million, but now
the classic majority gets all of the increase in AGI. If AGI
doubles to $6 million, then the classic majority gets seventyfive percent and the new majority twenty-five percent. Likewise, if the per-person limit stays the same but the number of
taxpayers increases, the new majority benefits more than the
classic majority. Assume that total AGI stays at $3 million, but
now this world contains fifteen taxpayers: the new majority can
deduct up to $2.25 million, or seventy-five percent, and the
classic majority only gets twenty-five percent.223
220. This is so because aggregate taxable income of $3 million and a tax
rate of thirty-five percent would yield approximately $1 million in tax revenues.
221. Under this scenario, taxable income would be $1.5 million, and tax
revenue would be roughly $500,000. The total amount of charitable deductions
claimed would also be $1.5 million, yielding a subsidy of roughly $500,000 to
the donors’ favored projects.
222. If the subsidy were a credit, the aggregate allowable credit in this
example would be roughly $500,000. (Having an aggregate AGI of $3 million
yields approximately $1 million in tentative tax liability to be split). If there
were ten taxpayers, the correct per-person credit would be $50,000; if there
were fifteen taxpayers, the correct credit would be $35,000, and so on.
223. The same distortions would result if the subsidy were structured as a
credit limited with an absolute per-person dollar cap.
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A per-person cap on the deduction (or credit), therefore,
splits the pie exactly in the manner bargained for by the parties only in extremely limited circumstances. In the real world,
AGI fluctuates over time, as does the number of taxpayers.224 It
is highly unlikely that any single cap would reflect the exact
bargained-for division of governmental funds.
Starting from the aggregate pie and then crafting a perperson limit to divide the aggregate pie does not work in a nonstatic world. In the face of changes such as total income or the
number of taxpayers, the only way to maintain the bargainedfor split of the overall pie is to focus on each individual taxpayer’s pie.225 If the two majorities each bargain for half of Alex’s
pie, half of Bonnie’s pie, half of Christine’s pie, and so forth,
then, across taxpayers, they will have bargained for half of the
total pie. Getting the bargain right on the individual level necessarily means that the bargain will be right in the aggregate—
even in the face of changing circumstances—whereas the opposite is not true.
Per-person dollar ceilings, however, will not get the bargain right on an individual level. Any given per-person dollar
limit will be more than half of many taxpayers’ incomes, and
will be less than half of many other taxpayers’ incomes. It will
only be happenstance that the ceiling constitutes exactly half of
any given taxpayer’s income.
On the other hand, per-person dollar ceilings may get the
overall division roughly correct. Maybe rough justice, coupled
with the fact that per-person dollar ceilings are easy to understand and are similar to other limits in the Code,226 renders
them a “good-enough” method of implementing the dualmajority bargain. While such caps might ensure that each majority has roughly enough for its preferred set of projects, they
224. See Michael Parisi & Michael Strudler, Selected Income and Tax Items
from Inflation-Indexed Individual Tax Returns, 1990-2004, in 26 STATISTICS
OF INCOME DIVISION, IRS, SOI BULLETIN 75 (Spring 2007), available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/90-04indiv.pdf.
225. The above analysis first examined total income in the aggregate to
determine which per-person limit would implement a bargained-for split of the
pie. Once a given per-person cap is set, however, it is almost certain that either total income or the number of taxpayers will fluctuate. See id. Unless the
per-person cap fluctuates in tandem with those factors (which would be administratively difficult, if not impossible), it will no longer reflect the appropriate
division of funds.
226. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163(h) (2000) (imposing a ceiling on mortgage interest deduction).
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do not address the optics problem described above. This is so
because the chosen cap will allow some taxpayers, but not others, to deduct all their income and thus fund none of the priorities set by the legislative process. The perception that some individuals might be able to undermine the decisions of their
fellow citizens still remains.
Perhaps this perception only matters in the case of wealthy
people. If so, a low per-person cap isn’t problematic on optics
grounds. But any realistic per-person cap would likely be fairly
high,227 thus enabling a large percentage of people to pay no
tax. If we only cared about requiring the super-ultra-wealthy to
support government projects, then a high per-person cap would
still satisfy the optics problem. This, however, raises its own set
of troubling implications: Why should one set of individuals
have a different set of obligations vis-à-vis their fellow citizens
than another set?228
For this reason, therefore, it seems that a per-person dollar
cap on the charitable deduction (or credit) is not the best way to
implement the dual-majority bargain. Although such a cap
might roughly implement the bargained-for division of funds, it
would not ensure that each taxpayer contributes not only to
their pet project but also to the good projects chosen by their
fellow citizens. Because per-person dollar caps thus do not address the optics problem, they are not the most appealing implementation of the dual-majority bargain.
2. Per-Transfer Limits and the Dual-Majority Bargain
Per-transfer limits also are not an appealing way of implementing the dual-majority bargain. Such limits would not
split the pie in the manner bargained for in the dual-majority
bargain.229 As explained above, the only way to ensure that the
aggregate pie is split down the middle is to ensure each taxpayer’s pie is split down the middle. To illustrate the effect of a
per-transfer limit, let’s imagine Gail, a hypothetical taxpayer
227. This is based solely on intuition. Right now, many large and influential charities rely heavily on a small number of large gifts (in addition to a large
number of small gifts). One can only imagine the outcry if individuals could no
longer deduct more than $500,000, $1 million, $2 million, or even $5 million
each year. As a matter of political reality, therefore, it seems likely that any
per-person ceiling would be so high as to be meaningless for most people.
228. The next article in this series will address that question on political
philosophy grounds.
229. Although this analysis continues to use a fifty-fifty split as an example, the reasoning would apply to any other split the parties made.
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with income, before charitable deductions, of $100,000 and a
tax rate of thirty-five percent. Gail’s income produces an individual pie of government funds worth $35,000. Under the reasoning described above, a bargain has been struck whereby she
is allowed to use half ($17,500) for her pet projects, but no
more. The other half must go to the government to fund its
projects. Of course, Gail might choose not to use any or all of
her half of the pie, but the new majority bargained for her to
have that option.
Will allowing taxpayers to deduct a set percentage of each
transfer implement the dual-majority bargain in an appealing
way? The likely answer is no. If Gail’s ability to use the charitable deduction is limited on a per-transfer basis, she is cheated
out of part of her half of the pie unless she transfers all her income to charity.
To illustrate, if Gail’s only charitable contribution for the
year is a single $10,000 donation, then she should receive a full
$10,000 deduction, which would be equivalent to allowing her
to take out a $3500 piece of the pie for her preferred project.
This is because the $10,000 deduction lowers her tax bill by
$3500, generating a $3500 “matching transfer” to her chosen
charity. If, however, she can deduct only a portion of that
$10,000 transfer, then she does not receive the full subsidy due
to her (since she should be able to access a subsidy of up to
$17,500). A per-transfer limit thus precludes individuals in the
new majority from receiving their bargained-for share unless
they contribute their whole income.230
Moreover, if Gail’s donations exceed her income for the
year, then the government is cheated out of part of its half of
the pie. To illustrate, imagine that taxpayers can deduct fifty
percent of each donation. Next, suppose that despite having an
income of only $100,000, Gail donates $200,000 to charity.
Even if she could only deduct fifty percent of each gift, she
could still take deductions totaling $100,000 and wipe out her
tax liability. Regardless of the amount of the per-transfer limit,
Gail could hypothetically donate an amount larger than her
230. This reasoning applies regardless of what portion of the pie each majority bargained for. It applies, for example, even if the new majority bargained for a share of the pie other than a fifty-fifty split. It also holds if the
subsidy is structured as a credit limited to some portion of each transfer, such
that it amounts to less than thirty-five cents for each dollar donated to charity.
In Gail’s example, if she received a credit of less than $3500 for a $10,000 donation, then she would be deprived of the full subsidy bargained for on her
behalf.
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income, take deductions totaling more than half her income,
and thereby deprive the government of part of its half of the
pie.
Lastly, per-transfer limits do not fully address the optics
problem. As demonstrated above, they still allow some individuals potentially to zero out their tax liability via charitable contributions. The unfairness resulting from the ability of some
individuals potentially to undermine the decisions made by the
legislative process would thus still remain.
3. Percentage-of-Income Limits and the Dual-Majority
Bargain
A limit based on percentage-of-AGI (or tentative tax liability, in the case of a credit), however, solves the problems inherent in the other two limits. First, unlike per-person dollar
caps, percentage-of-income limits keep the bargained-for division of the pie constant in the face of changes such as aggregate
AGI and numbers of taxpayers. Second, such limits solve the
optics problem while ensuring that each majority receives its
bargained-for division of the pie when its members contribute
less than their entire income.
To illustrate, imagine a rule limiting each donor to a deduction equal to fifty percent of her income (much like the current rule). Until the limit is triggered, Gail may fully deduct
her transfers and receive as much of her half of the pie as she
desires. For example, if Gail donates $50,000 or less to charity,
assuming an income of $100,000, she receives a deduction for
the entire transfer. She is now able to take as much of her
share of the pie as she desires, ensuring that the new majority
has received its bargained-for share of the pie. The same analysis follows if there is a charitable credit instead of a charitable
deduction. In that situation, Gail should receive the entire thirty-five cent credit for each dollar transferred to charity until
the point at which her credit equals her tax liability (that is,
her half of the pie and the classic majority’s half of the pie are
equal).
However, once Gail’s donations exceed fifty percent of her
income, the limits kick in to protect the classic majority. Imagine, for example, that Gail donates $60,000 to charity. If she
could deduct all of it, the governmental subsidy of her pet
project would be $21,000 (the amount by which her tax bill decreases when rates are thirty-five percent) and her taxable income would drop to $40,000, resulting in a tax bill of $14,000.
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She would then get more than the bargained-for share of the
pie, thus hurting the classic majority.
If, however, Gail can deduct only $50,000 of her transfer,
that problem is rectified. In that situation, her taxable income
drops by only $50,000 (instead of $60,000). This reduces Gail’s
tax bill by only $17,500 (instead of $21,000), accordingly lowering the governmental subsidy of her pet project from $21,000 to
$17,500. At the same time, her tax bill now rises from $14,000
to $17,500. The government is now funding her pet project
equally with the lighthouse: $17,500 of Gail’s pie goes to
each.231
Percentage-of-AGI limits (or percentage-of-tax liability limits, in the case of a charitable credit) thus split each individual
taxpayer’s pie down the middle. Aggregating across taxpayers
then necessarily splits the total amount of federal funds available down the middle as well. In this manner, this limit allows
members of the new majority to take as much as they want
from the pie up to the point at which they have taken their
whole share, but it prevents them from taking more than their
share. The AGI limits also solve the optics problem by erasing
the ability of any individual to undermine the decisions of the
legislative process. When coupled with the structural issues
addressed above, percentage-of-income limits are therefore the
best method of precluding a taxpayer from zeroing out her tax
bill via charitable contributions. Limiting the charitable subsidy in this way reconciles the delivery of public goods through
the private charitable sector with broader principles of demo-

231. As a technical matter, due to the increasing marginal-rate structure,
Gail actually directs something slightly more than fifty percent of her pie to
her projects and something slightly less than fifty percent of her pie to the
government’s projects. This is so because her deduction comes off the top of
her income and results in the subsidy being calculated at her highest marginal
rate or rates. In contrast, the tax rate applied to her remaining taxable income
will be the lower rates applicable to her. This distinction between “exactly”
fifty percent and “really close” to fifty percent is very fine and likely lost on
most of the individuals involved in this bargain. Allowing a deduction of up to
fifty percent of AGI “looks like” they are splitting the pie down the middle to
most people, and, in fact, comes quite close—closer than per-person dollar ceilings or per-transfer limits. If the subsidy were a credit limited to some portion
of tentative tax liability, then the split would be exact. This is because it does
not matter whether a one dollar credit comes “off the top” or “off the bottom.”
A one dollar credit erases one dollar worth of tax liability, however that liability was calculated.
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cratic government, allowing both to co-exist within the same
system.232
D. The Dual-Majority Bargain, Appreciated Property, and Private Foundations
The analysis thus far has employed the current fiftypercent limit applicable to cash contributions to public charities
as an example. As explained in Part I, however, the existing
limit drops to thirty percent for donations of appreciated assets
to public charities and thirty percent for cash contributions to
private foundations.233 For donations of appreciated assets to
private foundations, the AGI limit is twenty percent.234 Would
the analysis proposed above also justify more stringent limitations in these situations? Perhaps.
Charities currently receive an additional subsidy when
someone donates appreciated property. To illustrate, imagine a
taxpayer with an AGI of $200 who makes a $100 cash donation
and is in the thirty-five percent bracket. Under the bargain de232. This Article’s framework also applies to the more traditional subsidy
theory, although the argument is not as precise. No matter how noble or worthy charitable projects are, they are, by definition, not government-funded
projects. To supporters of the traditional subsidy theory, this is precisely what
justifies the charitable tax subsidies. Even so, however, it is plausible that
such traditionalists may not want to take their own arguments too far.
While some traditionalists may be comfortable with a world in which individuals can fund only their desired projects and not contribute to governmental projects, it also likely that not all traditionalists are comfortable with
that scenario and that many supporters of the charitable sector are at least, on
some level, also supporters of the government. If one supports the charitable
sector because it provides alternative solutions to social problems, one may
want to see solutions offered by the government as well. If one supports the
charitable sector on the grounds that it redistributes power in our society and
enhances pluralism, one might likely want to create some sort of checks-andbalances system whereby both the charitable sector and the government
shared power.
Lastly, most (but not all) individuals who bump up against the AGI limits
are wealthier individuals. Perhaps the limits represent a desire to make sure
that wealthy individuals contribute to the same pot of chosen works as lesswealthy individuals, so that wealthy individuals do not “opt out” of the common government and operate solely in the charitable sector. See ODENDAHL,
supra note 90, at 233 (“In this way the upper class, rather than the majority of
the population, through a political process, defines the public good.”); id. at
239 (suggesting that any one person should be limited in her charitable contributions, in a similar manner to the limits placed on political contributions).
233. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1) (West Supp. 2008).
234. Id.
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scribed above, her pie of governmental funds is $70. Allowing
her to deduct $100 lets her direct $35 of that pie to her preferred project so long as she funds the classic majority’s
projects to the tune of $35.
Now imagine that she also owns some stock with a fair
market value of $100 and a basis of $20. If she sells the stock
and then donates $100 cash to charity, she pays tax on the $80
appreciation. Her pie thereby increases from $70 to $82 (assuming she receives the preference for long-term capital gain
property and is taxed at only fifteen percent). To split her new
pie equally, each majority should receive $41 for its projects.
Under current law, however, she pays no tax on the appreciation if she donates the stock itself to charity—keeping her
official “pie” at $70 and each majority’s share at $35. Allowing
her a deduction for the untaxed appreciation, however, essentially means that the charity’s subsidy increases by the $12 of
foregone tax. Now her preferred project receives $47 and the
classic majority receives only $35—a split no longer in line with
the initial bargain.
In this manner, charities currently receive an increased
subsidy from donations of appreciated property. This additional
subsidy may well affect the way the two majorities split the pie
in such situations. To that end, it may be plausible that a different bargain is struck in which taxpayers making donations
of appreciated property are limited to a smaller percentage of
AGI.
What about private foundations, which are usually founded
by a single donor or family and generally do not operate their
own charitable activities but instead make grants to other organizations that conduct charitable activities directly? One
twist in the private foundation rules is that the foundations are
required to spend at minimum only five percent of their assets
each year on charitable activities.235 This minimum includes
not only grants to other charities but also administrative expenses, like salaries.236
While, as a normative matter, I believe that private foundations should not be treated differently, supporters of private
foundations might not be able to strike the same bargain as
individuals supporting public charities. First, due to the lenient
minimum pay-out rules, the immediate benefit of funding pub235. See I.R.C. § 4942 (2000).
236. Id.
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lic goods is delayed. Although donated assets must eventually
fund such projects, in the interim, they remain under the private control of trustees chosen by the founders. Thus, it may
appear to the classic majority that private foundation supporters have less to bargain with, in terms of the funding for public goods than supporters of public charities.
Second, any given private foundation attracts financial
support from far fewer people than any given public charity,
which by definition must attract at least thirty-three percent of
its support from the general public.237 Perhaps the knowledge
that many people support a minority project makes the bargain
described above palatable with respect to public charities. In
contrast, the classic majority may be less willing to subsidize
projects that, by definition, are initially supported only by one
or a few individuals. In any case, it is plausible that the two
majorities might split the pie differently in the case of private
foundations.
E. THE DUAL-MAJORITY BARGAIN AND NON-MAJORITARIAN
MODELS OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
As seen above, current literature on the charitable tax subsidies uses a majoritarian median-voter model for simplicity.238
It conceptualizes the deduction as a bargain among minority
high-demand voters who come together to create a new majority to obtain partial funding for their favored projects. Building
on that model, this Article has argued that percentage-ofincome caps represent a second bargain between the new majority and the classic majority that ensures each group will receive funding for its projects.239
By definition, the median-voter model assumes that the
preferences of the median voter (as opposed to the preferences
of individual legislators) shape the decisions of the legislature—that is, that the legislature accurately reflects the views
of the voters.240 The prior charitable goods literature using that
model acknowledges that other models of the legislative process
exist. It also accurately argues that any political process will
237. See id. § 509(a) (defining a private foundation).
238. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 101–13; Gergen, supra note
14, at 1403; Weisbrod, supra note 10, at 23–25 & n.4.
239. See supra Part IV.A.
240. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT 132–34 (1962) (describing simple majority voting); COLOMBO
& HALL, supra note 10, at 102.
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leave some voters dissatisfied with the level of public goods
produced, in turn leading to the creation and subsidization of
the nonprofit sector.241 Although a full analysis of either that
argument or the percentage-of-AGI limits under alternative
models is beyond this Article’s scope, a brief preliminary exploration of those issues is warranted.
There are several models in which legislative decisions
may not represent the preferences of the median voter.242 The
most common include: republican theory, classic interest group
theory, logrolling, and the pivotal politics models.243 Under the
republican model of the legislative process, it may be the case
that legislative decisions do not reflect the preferences of the
electorate of the whole as a result of a reasoned, republican,
public-minded deliberative process.244 In this model, the preferences of the electorate are filtered and refined during the careful deliberation that occurs during the legislative process.245
Legislators’ votes on which public goods to fund will thus reflect
this reasoned debate, instead of blindly reflecting the preferences of the electorate.246
Even after thoughtful deliberation, however, it is quite
plausible that individual legislators will still have differing
views about what quantities of various public goods are appropriate for the government to fund. Some legislators, therefore,
will be dissatisfied with the funding allocated to a project that
241. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 103; Gergen, supra note 14,
at 1399; Weisbrod, supra note 10, at 24 (“For our present purposes we require
only that the political process leaves significant numbers of voters dissatisfied
with government output and taxation levels.”).
242. See Weisbrod, supra note 10, at 23 n.4 (citing Kenneth J. Arrow, The
Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market
Versus Nonmarket Allocation, in PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND POLICY ANALYSIS
59, 70 (Robert H. Haveman & Julius Margolis eds., 1971)).
243. Much more could be said, of course, about how the charitable tax subsidies fare under each framework. I do not claim fully to analyze either the
subsidies or their limits under these models; such an analysis would be a complete work in and of itself. Nor do I claim to address the full assortment of
ways in which the legislative process can depart from the median-voter model.
I do not address, for example, Arrow’s cycling problem. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). Rather, I simply aim to offer a few preliminary thoughts about whether the dualmajority bargain described in this Article is consistent with the basic tenets of
some of the more common alternative models.
244. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE
42–47 (1991).
245. See id.
246. See id.
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they feel is beneficial to the public good, such as the ballet or
tutoring programs in rural areas.
These dissatisfied legislators may come together in a spirit
of public-mindedness to provide at least some funding, via the
charitable tax subsidies, for each others’ views of the public
good. Just as in the median-voter model of the dual-majority
bargain outlined above,247 however, two majorities of legislators
still exist simultaneously: one majority voting to fund some
public goods fully, and another majority voting to fund other
public goods partially. These two majorities must still reconcile
their conflicting interests, and capping the tax subsidy for the
partially funded public goods does just that by ensuring that
the projects garnering full financial support during the deliberative process will not be undermined.
Charitable tax subsidies and percentage-of-income limits
are also consistent with various interest group models of legislation. Take, for example, the classic public choice story in
which lawmakers provide legislation to the highest bidder. In
this model, the legislature will fully fund only those public
goods whose supporters can afford the payments demanded by
the legislature, with payment in the form of votes, endorsements, contributions, and future favors.248 For example, supporters of a strong national defense may be able to promise
enough votes (perhaps from military servicemen and women) to
garner full funding by the government. In contrast, supporters
of other public goods (for example, community theater) who
cannot match that price will lose out in the bidding war for legislation and thus fail to garner full funding for their projects.249
It is quite plausible, however, that by working together, losing
bidders of disparate charitable projects can afford to “buy” a
partial subsidy for their projects from the legislature.250
247. See supra Part III.A.2.b.
248. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 244, at 15 (quoting William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975)).
249. This is consistent with Mancur Olson’s general observation that supporters of public goods often struggle to influence political activity due to freerider problems. Olson also recognizes, however, that some such groups provide
direct, non-political services to group members, thus making them better
equipped to overcome free-rider problems. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION 132–34 (1965).
250. Saul Levmore’s “pessimistic” take on public choice theory and the charitable deduction is similar. Levmore, supra note 86, at 387–408. Under that
view, Congress outsources to voters the decision of which public goods to subsidize via the tax subsidies because “legislators . . . have more to lose from
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Once again, two majorities exist simultaneously: the classic
majority who has sold full funding of some projects and the new
majority that has sold partial funding of other projects via charitable tax subsidies. Once again, these two majorities must
reconcile their interests. Capping the charitable subsidy ensures that the classic majority can still provide full funding of
some projects to those bidders who can afford it.251
A logrolling model of legislation (in which various legislators trade votes with each other to secure funding for their preferred projects)252 yields a similar analysis, although there are
two plausible ways for both the subsidy and the cap to arise. In
the first scenario, similar to the model mentioned above, the
logrolling process itself produces winners and losers. To illustrate, imagine a scenario in which most legislators are relatively indifferent about the level of funding for a given public
good (Project A), but that supporters of Project A are extremely
enthusiastic about their support. It might be the case that
Project A’s supporters trade votes on other issues (perhaps voting to fund Project B, about which they are indifferent) with
enough other legislators to gain a majority vote for full funding
for Project A. In this example, logrolling has allowed some legislators to get exactly what they want.
Not all legislators, however, have that ability. Assume that
a third project (Project C) exists, that most legislators are relatively indifferent about the level of funding for Project C, and
that its supporters are very enthusiastic about their support.
So far, Project C seems like Project A. It might be the case,
however, that supporters of Project C are hostile to Project B,
or otherwise unable to trade votes to obtain funding for Project
C. Assume the same about supporters of Projects D and E—for
whatever reason, they cannot successfully logroll to get their
favoring some organizations or causes over others than they would gain from
such favoritism.” Id. at 408. Although Levmore analyzed whether voters (via
the charitable deduction) or Congress (via direct grants) should decide which
projects receive subsidies, the point that legislators may not stand to gain very
much from supporters of charitable causes remains. Id.
251. Levmore also offers an “optimistic” view of public choice theory and
the deduction, which frames the deduction as a “precommitment by Congress
to refrain from . . . encouraging rent-seeking[ ] where it might have.” Levmore,
supra note 86, at 408. A limit on the deduction is also plausible under this
view; while Congress may precommit not to rent seek in the charitable arena,
an unlimited deduction could potentially undermine its ability to fund other
projects and, therefore, rent seek in those areas.
252. For an excellent description of logrolling, see BUCHANAN & TULLOCK,
supra note 240, at 132–42 (1962).
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projects fully funded. Logrolling, like other models of the legislative process, still produces winners and losers in the legislative process.
The traditional economic model for the charitable deduction, in which dissatisfied voters bargain with each other to obtain part funding for each others’ projects, also applies here. In
fact, that model is itself a logrolling model, since it suggests
that supporters of one underfunded project agree to vote for
partial funding for another project in exchange for partial support of their project.253 Legislators (or groups thereof) who did
not have enough “logrolling clout” to obtain full funding are
nonetheless able, working with other such legislators, to wield
just enough clout to obtain partial funding for their projects.
Once again, two majorities of legislators exist simultaneously: one majority whose members are able to trade enough
votes to obtain full funding for their projects and another majority that is able to trade only enough votes to procure partial
funding. Once again, these two majorities must reconcile their
competing interests, and percentage-of-income limits do this.
They allow the majority with enough clout to trade for full
funding to ensure that it does, in fact, receive full funding for
those projects.
In the second logrolling scenario, the charitable subsidy itself may be part of the very vote-trading that results in the
funding of some goods by the government but not others. For
example, supporters of a lighthouse might “buy” votes from
supporters of a community theater by assuring the latter of
partial funding via a charitable deduction or credit. In this instance, the bargain is not made after the fact and is not solely
among losing groups. Rather, the bargain is made at the same
time as the initial set of decisions about what to fund, and is
between voters who willingly forego full government funding of
their preferred goods for some reason and those who insist
upon full funding.
Again, the essentials of this Article’s proposal still apply:
percentage-of-income limits serve as a second bargain between
these two groups that enables the initial bargain to hold. Without such limits, the group that supposedly “foregoes” full funding of its preferred goods and supports full funding of other
253. See id. at 135 (providing an example of individual farmers agreeing to
fund repair of roads for the benefit of other farmers in the township in exchange for repair of roads leading to their own farms).
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goods in exchange for partial funding (and perhaps some other
benefit) could do an “end-run” around this first bargain. If such
groups donate all their income to charity and do not pay any
taxes, then they are not truly supporting full funding of the
goods they promised to support.
A final theory in which legislative outcomes do not reflect
the preferences of the median voter is the pivotal politics model.254 This understanding of the legislative process posits that
the complex structure of the legislative process, which includes
committees, floor debates and potential filibusters, floor votes,
presidential vetoes, and super-majority veto overrides, sometimes prevents policies supported by the median voter or legislator from enactment.255 This occurs when a piece of legislation
fails to clear a pivotal veto-gate, such as a filibuster or presidential veto, even if a majority of the legislature supports it.256
Under this model, to obtain full funding for a given public
good, it must garner the support of a majority of committee
members, then a majority of legislators without facing a filibuster by a determined minority, and then either the president (if
he does not veto such funding) or a super-majority of legislators
who override a presidential veto.257 Supporters of these goods
are winners in the legislative process, while legislators whose
preferred goods do not emerge from all these veto-gates comprise an initial set of losers.
It is entirely plausible, however, that by working together,
the latter can successfully navigate the political process to obtain partial funding for their projects via the charitable tax
subsidies. It is also plausible, however, that the actors controlling the various veto-gates might insist on capping that subsidy
so that their preferred projects (which already obtained full
funding) are not jeopardized. Although this model conceptualizes percentage-of-income limits as a bargain between suppor254. Cf. KEITH KREIEHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS 20–48 (1998) (explaining
pivotal-politics theory).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 22–24.
257. This model in and of itself does not, of course, explain why the key
players in this process support the projects they do. The key players might be
reflecting the preferences of their constituents, or perhaps their support stems
from deliberate, republican-style deliberation. Alternatively, the support
might be the product of logrolling or classic interest-group theory. This model,
which focuses on how structure affects outcomes, can coexist without contradiction with the other models of how preferences are shaped within that legislative structure.
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ters of charitable projects and controllers of the veto-gates, instead of between two majorities, the essential elements remain.
It is still a bargain between winners and losers in the legislative process.
These preliminary thoughts suggest that the framework of
the dual-majority bargain applies regardless of what model of
the legislative process is used. In each model, there will be
winners and losers after the initial decisions about which
projects to fund fully. As these former losers come together to
get partial funding for their projects, they become a second set
of winners. At this point, two sets of “winners” exist simultaneously. Limiting the charitable subsidy can be thought of as a
bargain among these two sets of winners, allowing the two sets
to reconcile their competing interests. And in each case, for the
reasons outlined in Part IV.C.3, percentage-of-income limits
strike this bargain better than other potential limits.
CONCLUSION
This Article articulates the first of two justifications for
precluding charitable donors from zeroing out their tax liability. The first stems from the economic subsidy theory for the
charitable deduction, which posits that a democratic process
dependent upon majority preferences will supply public goods
only at the level demanded by the median voter. This majority,
the “classic majority,” therefore supplies some public goods but
not others. Individuals supporting the under-supplied public
goods then coalesce to form a “new majority” that agrees to
provide partial funding (via a tax subsidy) for each other’s preferred minority projects. In that manner, charitable tax subsidies allow individuals whose preferences differ from the classic
majority to redirect a portion of funds otherwise flowing to the
federal fisc toward their preferred visions of the public good.
Limiting the deduction to some portion of an individual’s
income represents a second bargain, this time between the
classic majority and the new majority. The classic majority will
fund the new majority’s minority-preferred projects only to the
extent the new majority agrees to fund the classic majority’s
preferred projects, and vice versa. Limiting an individual’s charitable deduction to half of her income implements this bargain
by ensuring that the amount of governmental subsidy to her
preferred minority projects will not exceed the amount of taxes
she pays to fund the classic majority’s projects. This bargainsaving role is a compelling economic explanation for precluding
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a taxpayer from erasing her tax liability by making charitable
contributions.
The second article in this series will build on this economic
explanation by arguing that political theory also justifies requiring individuals who donate all their income to charity still
to pay some income tax. Briefly, as an initial matter, the very
existence of a tax subsidy for charitable donations reflects the
notion that citizens in a free and equal society will hold differing conceptions of the “good.” Limiting the subsidy, however,
reinforces the scheme of fair cooperation that enables that very
citizenry with diverse views of the good to come together to
form a stable and just system of self-governance in the first instance.
Specifically, a limit that precludes someone from erasing
his tax liability through charitable donations reflects the notion
of reciprocity, which is the idea that free and equal citizens will
reasonably propose terms for cooperation that they believe other free and equal citizens will reasonably accept.258 Reciprocity
suggests that one person cannot reasonably agree to terms of
cooperation for a joint project if she knows others can opt out
later: allowing others to opt out post hoc undermines the whole
point of cooperating in the first place and creates instability.
Precluding citizens from opting out of funding public goods
identified by a just legislative process and requiring individuals
who make substantial charitable donations still to pay some
income tax protects democratic equality and is justified on political theory grounds.
Layering political philosophy onto the economic theory of
the dual-majority bargain will answer the questions left unanswered in prior justifications for limiting the subsidy granted
to any given charitable donor. It is “unfair” to let some individuals pay no tax because doing so jeopardizes the ability of the
classic majority to ensure that the projects it prioritizes retain
adequate funding. It also denigrates the character of our democratic system. This explains the appeal of the “crude minimum
tax” justification that everyone must pay some tax; the appeal
of the optics argument that it seems unfair for some citizens to
not pay tax; and the conclusion that even if some people give all
their income to charity, they are somehow not living up to their
civic obligations if they pay no tax.

258. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 16 (1993).

